Post-Crawford: Time to Liberalize the Substantive Admissibility of a Testifying Witness\u27s Prior Consistent Statements by McLain, Lynn
University of Baltimore Law
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship
Fall 2005
Post-Crawford: Time to Liberalize the Substantive
Admissibility of a Testifying Witness's Prior
Consistent Statements
Lynn McLain
University of Baltimore School of Law, lmclain@ubalt.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Evidence Commons,
Family Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Post-Crawford: Time to Liberalize the Substantive Admissibility of a Testifying Witness's Prior Consistent Statements, 74 UMKC L.
Rev. 1 (2005)
POST-CRAWFORD: TIME TO LIBERALIZE THE 
SUBSTANTIVE ADMISSIBILITY OF A TESTIFYING 
WITNESS'S PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
Lynn McLain' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are a juror in a criminal trial for sexual child abuse. The 
alleged victim, a quivering five-year old, testifies for the' prosecution; however, 
his speech is halting, his manner unsure, and much of his testimony is given in 
whispered one-syllable replies to the prosecutor's leading questions.! There are 
no other eyewitnesses to the alleged abuse.2 
Despite compelling medical testimony and photographic evidence of the 
boy's tom anus/ you cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is 
• Professor of Law and Dean Joseph Curtis Faculty Fellow, University of Baltimore School of Law; 
B.A, University of Pennsylvania, 1971; J.D., Duke Law School, 1974. The author served as a 
Special Reporter for the Rules Committee of the Court of Appeals of Maryland during its evidence 
codification project. She thanks Tom Lininger and Max Oppenheimer for their comments; Pia 
Gomez, Esq., Erika Schissler, J.D., 2005, and April Renee Randall for their research assistance; and 
Barbara Coyle Jones for her unparalleled administrative assistance. 
I See, e.g., Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1995). 
At trial AT., then 6 112 years old, was the Government's first witness. For the most 
part, her direct testimony consisted of one- and two-word answers to a series of 
leading questions. Cross-examination took place over two trial days. The defense 
asked A.T. 348 questions. On the first day AT. answered all the questions posed to 
her on general, background subjects. The next day there was no testimony, and the 
prosecutor met with AT. When cross-examination of AT. resumed, she was 
questioned about those conversations but was reluctant to discuss them. Defense 
counsel then began questioning her about the allegations of abuse, and it appears she 
was reluctant at many points to answer. As the trial judge noted, however, some of 
the defense questions were imprecise or unclear. The judge expressed his concerns 
with the examination of AT., observing there were lapses of as much as 40-55 
seconds between some questions and the answers and that on the second day of 
examination, the witness seemed to be losing concentration. The trial judge stated, 
"We have a very difficult situation here." 
Id. See infra notes 101 and 126. See also United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 87 (8th Cir. 
1980) ("At trial Lucy [the nine-year-old victim] was unable to repeat the statements she had made 
to Officer Marshall and Dr. Hopkins although she was able to provide some facts .to support her 
earlier statements."). See generally JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 
CASES §§ 1.2-1.7, 1.29, 6.1-6.22 (3d ed. 1997) (describing and explaining difficulties faced by 
child witnesses). 
2 See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39,60 (1987) (plurality opinion) ("Child abuse is one of the 
most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses 
except the victim."). 
3 See, e.g., C. M. Mahady-Smith, Comment, The Young Victim as Witness for the Prosecution: 
Another Form of Abuse?, 89 DICK. L. REv. 721,721-22 (1985) (reporting the dropping ofa sexual 
abuse case due to inadmissibility ofa child's statements identifying his abuser, when the three-year 
old boy had gonorrhea of the mouth, penis, and rectum); J~ckie Powder, Judge's Ban of Social 
2 UMKC LA W REVIEW [Vol. 74:1 
the abuser when you have only the child's trial testimony on that point. You 
would like to hear when, to whom, and under what circumstances the child 
reported the alleged abuse in order to help you evaluate the defense's contention 
that the child's mother has coached him to fabricate the claim against the 
defendant. 
What you do not know is that although the prosecution is eager to present 
evidence of the child's prior statements, consistent with his trial testimony, the 
United States Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Tome v. United States4 has read 
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(I)(Bi to prevent the prosecution's offering 
those statements as substantive evidence. As a result of that decision, the 
statements will also be inadmissible even for the limited purpose of helping to 
evaluate the credibility of a child, if there is a serious risk that the out-of-court 
statements would be used on the issue of guilt or innocence.6 
Moreover, after the Court's March 2004 decision in Crawford v. 
Washington,7 which redesigned the landscape of Confrontation ClauseS analysis, 
other avenues of substantive admissibility for the child's prior statements-the 
excited utterance hearsay exception,9 the residual "catch-all" hearsay exception, 10 
Worker's Testimony in Child Abuse Case Upsets Investigators, BALT. SUN, Aug. 9, 1992, at 6B (the 
stepfather of a five-year old Maryland girl who contracted gonorrhea was acquitted when the State 
was not permitted to prove that the child had described her stepfather having sexual intercourse 
with her to a police officer). 
4513 U.S. 150 (1995). 
5 Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(I)(B) provides: 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is 
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ... (B) 
consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied 
charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive .... 
6 See United States v. Kenyon, 397 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding it is reversible error to 
admit, for corroboration purposes, statements not admissible as substantive evidence); United 
States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 516-18 (4th Cir. 1995). See also infra note 129 and text 
accompanying note 141. 
7541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
8 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him .... "). This right is applied to the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). See generally, Chris Hutton, Sir 
Walter Raleigh Revived: The Supreme Court Re-Vamps Two Decades of Confrontation Clause 
Precedent in Crawford v. Washington, 50 S.D. L. REv. 41 (2005); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting 
Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REv. 747 (2005); Miguel A. Mendez, Crawford v. Washington: 
A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REv. 569 (2004); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: 
Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 511 (2005). 
9 Compare, e.g., People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding an excited 
utterance by 911 caller was "testimonial" and inadmissible absent compliance with Crawford) with 
People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2004) (holding exited utterances by 
domestic violence victim in 911 call were nontestimonial and would be admissible even if declarant 
did not testify at trial). See generally Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In 
Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1171 (2002); Hutton, supra note 8, at 66-71 (collecting post-
Crawford child abuse cases). 
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or the states' "tender years" hearsay exceptionll-are all in jeopardy unless the 
child testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the 
statement. The combination of Tome and Crawford has been a "one-two punch" 
for child abuse prosecutions. 
Yet Crawford reasserts that when the witness testifies at trial and can be 
cross-examined by the accused regarding those statements, there is no 
Confrontation Clause obstacle to admitting the witness's prior statements as 
substantive evidence.12 Therefore, given Crawford's emphasis on requiring that 
the accused have the ability to cross-examine the declarant about his or her 
statement, now is the ideal time to amend the rules of evidence to overrule Tome 
so as to permit the substantive use of any of a witness's prior statements, 
consistent with his or her trial testimony, that would be helpful to the fact-finder. 
Although the need for such an amendment may be starkest in child abuse 
prosecutions, the amendment will be of benefit in all types of cases. 
Part II of this article provides background information regarding Crawford 
and the changes it has wrought regarding the constitutional parameters on the 
admission of hearsay. Part III discusses the pre-Federal Rules of Evidence 
common law regarding the substantive admissibility of a witness's prior 
consistent statements, the curious adoption of an underinclusive Federal Rule of 
Evidence ("Rule") 801(d)(l)(B), and the pre-Crawford case law construing the 
Rule, particularly the Court's decision in Tome. The Tome majority read the 
Rule to require that a witness's statement must have preceded the witness's 
alleged motive to lie at trial in order to be admissible under the Rule. 13 
Although the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules determined prior to 
Crawford that the need for an amendment of Rule 80l(d)(1)(B), which was 
suggested by Chief Judge Bullock of the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of North Carolina,14 did not justify the costs associated with any 
10 FED. R. EVID. 807. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63-65 (citing with disapproval cases that had 
affmned the admission of testimonial statements under this exception or its predecessors, former 
Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5)). The Tome majority suggested that the child 
victim's statements, although inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(l)(B), might be admissible under the 
catch-all (then Rule 803(24)), if they were shown to be reliable. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 
150, 166 (1995). That door has been closed by Crawford, at least as to testimonial statements when 
the declarant does not testify at trial and Crawford'S requirements have not otherwise been met. 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
II See State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314 (Md. 2005) (holding it is reversible error to admit under 
Maryland's statutory "tender years" hearsay exception a social worker's testimony as to children's 
out-of-court "testimonial" statements which were made in the presence of a police detective, when 
the children did not testify). See generally Lynn McLain, Children Are Losing Maryland's 
"Tender Years" War, 27 U. BALT. L. REv. 21 (1997) (discussing Maryland's statute and citing 
"tender years" statutes of thirty-six other states). 
12 See infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
14 See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., 4 Federal Rules of Evidence Manual § 801.02[4][b] at 801-
33 & n.31 (8th ed. 2002) ("Persuasive arguments have been made that Rule 80l(d)(l)(B) should be 
amended to provide that a prior consistent statement is admissible for its truth whenever it is 
admissible to rehabilitate [a] witness."); Frank W. Bullock, Jr. & Steven Gardner, Prior Consistent 
Statements and the Premotive Rule, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 509 (1997); Daniel S. Capra, 
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amendment/5 Crawford has raised the stakes considerably. Part IV argues that 
post-Crawford is the ideal time to revive and refine Judge Bullock's proposal that 
Rule 801(d)(1)(B)16 should be amended. The amendment should permit the 
substantive use (subject to the court's exercise of discretion under Rule 403) of 
all of a witness's prior c<?nsistent statements that would be. helpful to the fact-
finder in assessing the credibility of the witness's trial testimony given whatever 
method of impea.chment of the witness had occurred. That test, like the test of 
helpfulness of lay or expert opinion evidence under Rules 701 17 and 702,18 ought 
to be a flexible one; there should be no hard and fast rule requiring that an 
admissible prior consistent statement precede an alleged impeaching fact. 
Because the current Rule has a particularly devastating effect on the prosecution 
of sexual child abuse and other sexual assaults, in the event this amendment to 
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is not adopted, Part IV argues that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence should be amended to include, like the evidence laws of numerous 
states,19 a similar provision specifically admitting an alleged victi~ of sexual 
assault's prior consistent statements reporting the assault. 
II. THE POST -eRA WFORD LANDSCAPE 
Before Crawford, the Supreme Court's 1980 decision in Ohio v. RobertiO 
and its progeny applied the Confrontation Clause so as to establish the outer 
limits on admissibility of hearsay evidence against a criminal accused, regardless 
of whether the out-of-court statements were "testimonial" or "nontestimonial." 
Under Roberts, the Confrontation Clause and the rule against hearsay were 
conflated, so hearsay evidence that was sufficiently reliable21 and necessary22 
Memorandum to Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules (Nov. 1,2003) (on file with the author) 
(discussing proposal by Chief Judge Bullock, who acted as liaison from the Standing Rules 
Committee to the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, to amend Rule 801(d)(I)(B) so as to 
provide, as drafted by the Reporter, Professor Capra, that "a statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he 
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the 
statement, and the statement is ... consistent with the declarant's testimony and is admissible, 
subject to Rule 403, to rehabilitate the declarant's credibility as a witness."). 
15 E-mail from Daniel S. Capra, Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, to Lynn 
McLain, Professor of Law, Baltimore School of Law (the Committee "found that the benefits of an 
amendment did not outweigh the costs") (Mar. 30,2005,10:22 EST) (on file with author). 
16 The Federal Rules of Evidence apply in federal cases, but most states also have adopted codes 
based on the federal rules. See LYNN McLAIN, 5 MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL xvii 
n.2 (2d ed. 2001). See generally SALTZBURG, supra note 14 (should the federal rule be amended, 
those states likely would revisit their corollary rules as well). 
17 E.g., United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 926-27 (4th Cir. 1997) (fmding lay witness was 
properly allowed to give the opinion that the defendant was pictured in surveillance photograph, 
when there was a basis for concluding that witness's identification would be superior to jury's). 
18 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (adopting a flexible, 
multiple-factor test for admission of expert scientific evidence). 
19 See infra notes 160-64. 
20 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
21 Id. at 66. Reliability could be shown either (1) because the hearsay fell within a "firmly rooted" 
hearsay exception or (2) by "a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Id. 
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was admissible, even thougll the defendant most often had no opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarant. 23 Roberts applied the same analysis to testimonial 
and nontestimonial out-of-court statements. Crawford, on the other hand, 
construes the Confrontation Clause so as to require the opportunity for cross-
examination, rather than some other gauge of reliability, but applies the Clause 
only to testimonial statements. 
Under Crawford, the declarant is a "witness against" the accused within the 
meaning of the Sixth Amendment if the out-of-court statement was 
"testimonial.,,24 In that event, the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of the 
statement as substantive evidence25 for the prosecution, unless either (1) the 
defendant can cross-examine the declarant at trial,26 or (2) the declarant is 
unavailable to testify at trial, but the defendant earlier had an opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarant about the statement/7 or (3) the declarant's 
unavailability to testify at the trial was procured by the defendant, in which case 
the defendant has forfeited the ability to complain that he or she cannot cross-
examine the declarant. 28 
If the declarant is available to testify at the trial and the accused has the 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness-declarant, the Confrontation Clause 
guarantee has been met fully.29 Although the courts recognized this principle 
22Id. at 65 ("[T]he Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity."). A declarant's unavailability 
to testify at trial satisfies the requirement of necessity. Id. In White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) 
and United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387,395-96 (1986), the necessity prong was met by the fact 
that, even if the declarants had testified at trial, their testimony could not have duplicated the 
circumstances providing probative value to their out-of-court excited utterances, White, 502 U.S. 
346, statements made for purposes of obtaining medical treatment, id. at 356, or their statements 
during and in furtherance ofa conspiracy, Inadi, 475 U.S. at 395-96. 
23 E.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); BoUIjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). 
24 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,50-51,68 (2004). 
25 "The [Confrontation] Clause ... does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other 
than establishing the truth of the matter asserted," such as for impeachment of the declarant. Id. at 
59n.9. 
26/d. 
27/d. at 68. 
28/d. at 62 ("[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation 
claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an alternative means of 
determining reliability."). See generally Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of 
Chutzpah, 31 ISR. L. REv. 508 (1997); Richard D. Friedman, The Confrontation Blog, (Dec. 14, 
2004), http://confrontationright.blogspot.coml2004 _12_01_ confrontationright_ archive.html. 
29 E.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 
(1970); United States v. Powell, 334 F.3d 42, 45-46 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (applying this principle 
in the context of the admission of a testifying witness's prior consistent statements). But see 
Richard D. Friedman, Prior Statements of a Witness: A Nettlesome Corner of the Hearsay Thicket, 
1995 SUP. CT. REv. 277 (arguing that the admission of extrinsic evidence ofa witness's statements, 
generally consistent with, but more detailed than the witness's trial testimony, poses confrontation 
problems). Professor Friedman's objection, however, is answered at present by United States v. 
Owens in which Justice Scalia, writing for the majority of six, reiterated, "The Confrontation 
Clause guarantees only an opportunity for cross-examination, not cross-examination that is 
effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent the defense may wish." 484 U.S. 554, 559 
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before Crawford,30 it assumes more preeminence in a post-Crawford world in 
which Confrontation Clause analysis contemplates cross-examination only, rather 
than any other mechanism or test for ensuring reliability of the out-of-court 
statement. 31 
Post-Crawford, then, the admissibility of hearsay under the Confrontation 
Clause turns on (1) whether the out-of-court statement was "testimonial,,32 and, if 
so, then (2) whether the opportunity to cross-examine was either (a) provided to 
the accused or (b) forfeited by the accused's conduct that made the declarant 
unavailable to testify. Crawford strongly suggests, though it leaves a decision on 
the issue for another day/3 that the Court is inclined to hold that the 
Confrontation Clause does not apply to "nontestimonial" statements. 
Crawford teaches that the admissibility of nontestimonial out-of-court 
statements is circumscribed only by the law of hearsay, as the states (or, in 
federal cases, the evidence rules adopted by the Court and Congress) choose to 
define it.34 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, states, "Where nontestimonial 
hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the 
States flexibility in their development of hearsay law-as does Roberts, and as 
would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause 
scrutinyaltogether.,,35 
The startling idea that admissibility of nontestimonial hearsay, even when 
the declarant does not testify at trial, would then be governed simply by the 
applicable evidence rules, left Crawford'S readers asking what, if anything, 
would establish the constitutional parameters on the admission of such hearsay. 
The answer is provided in Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in White v. 
Illinois, 36 joined by Justice Scalia, presaging Crawford. Justice Thomas states: 
Although the historical concern with trial by affidavit and anonymous 
accusers does reflect concern with the reliability of the evidence against a 
defendant, the [Confrontation] Clause makes no distinction based on the 
reliability of the evidence presented .... Reliability is more properly a due 
process concern. There is no reason to strain the text of the Confrontation 
Clause to provide criminal defendants with a protection [regarding reliability 
of the evidence against them] that due process already provides them.37 
(1988). The Court found no error in'the substantive admission under Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(I)(C) of an out-of-court identification by an assault victim, when the victim was sworn as a 
witness at trial and subject to cross-examination, but due to brain damage from the assault had no 
memory of the basis for the identification. Id. at 564. 
30 E.g., Green, 399 U.S, at 162. 
31 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69 ("Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of 
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually 
prescribes: confrontation."). 
32Id. 
33 Id. at 60-61 
34Id. at 61. 
35Id. at 68. 
36 502 U.S. 346 (1992), 
37 Id. at 363-64. 
2005] POST-CRAWFORD: PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS 7 
Thus, the Court likely will hold in a future case that evidence rules regarding 
nontestimonial hearsay will be restrained not by the Confrontation Clause, but by 
the due process clause, which provides the constitutional guarantee that a 
judgment cannot be based on unreliable hearsay.38 Courts have traditional~ 
applied this due process guarantee in their review of administrative proceedings 9 
and probation revocation proceedings.40 Therefore, the reliability analysis of 
Ohio v. Roberts and its progeny (minus the necessity analysis) will continue to 
apply to the question of what nontestimonial hearsay evidence can support a 
judgment, but will do so under the due process clause, which historically has 
been less restrictive41 than had the Confrontation Clause cases pre-Crawford. 
If this prediction proves to be correct, the rules of evidence constitutionally 
could permit the admission of nontestimonial hearsay of nontestifying declarants 
as long as it meets the due process reliability standard. As to this category of 
out-of-court statements, even a general rule like that of the federal Administrative 
Procedure Act that only "irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence" 
must be excluded and judgments must be based on "reliable, probative, and 
substantial evidence".42 would be a permissible choice.43 Such an approach harks 
38 See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (finding procedural due process 
requirements were met when an agency based its decision on reliable hearsay experts' reports); 
Motor Vehicle Admin. v. McDorman, 772 A.2d 309 (Md. 2001) (holding an administrative 
agency's decision can be based on reliable hearsay); Bergstein v. State, 588 A.2d 779 (Md. 1991) 
(holding that an admission of reliable hearsay at a hearing to revoke a person's conditional release 
from a mental health facility did not violate due process, even though the admission would have 
been inadmissible at a trial). 
39 E.g., Richardson, 402 U.S. 389 (holding that procedural due process requirements were met 
when agency based its decision on a reliable hearsay experts' reports); Gimbel v. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm'n, 872 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir. 1989) ("It is well settled that hearsay may 
constitute substantial evidence in administrative hearings if factors assuring the underlying 
reliability and probative value of the evidence are present."); Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. 
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 654 So.2d 292 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 1995) (hearsay evidence 
admissible to supplement or explain admissible evidence); Spreadbury v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 745 
So.2d 1204, 1208-09 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (hearsay evidence may be admissible in administrative 
proceedings, as long as it is "of the type that reasonable persons would rely upon"); Motor Vehicle 
Admin. v. McDorman, 772 A.2d 309 (Md. 2001) (administrative agency's decision can be based on 
reliable hearsay); De Carlo v. Comm'n of Soc. Servs., 131 A.D.2d 31, 34-35 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1987) ("It is now well established that an agency can prove its case through hearsay evidence, so 
long as it is believable, relevant and probative.") (citations omitted). 
40 E.g., Bailey v. State, 612 A.2d 288 (Md. 1992). 
41 See, e.g., Richardson, 402 U.S. at 398-401 (discussing admissibility of physician's records and 
reports in an administrative hearing regarding social security disability claims). 
42 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1994). See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 1O-213(b)-(c) (2004 Rep!. 
Vol.) (evidence not excludable simply because it is hearsay; rather, "probative evidence that 
reasonable and prudent individuals commonly accept in the conduct of their affairs" is admissible). 
43 See Richard D. Friedman, Reflections on the Brooklyn Conference, (Feb. 21, 2005), 
http://confrontationright.blogspot.coml2005_02_0 1_ confrontationright_ archive.html. ("My own 
feeling is that [after Crawfordj hearsay law-as opposed to confrontation law-should generally 
become far less exclusionary and less rigid."). 
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back to the Federal Advisory Committee's Preliminary Draft of March 1969, 
which provided for the admissibility of hearsay having '''assurances of accuracy 
not likely to be enhanced by calling the declarant as a witness, '" and framed 
categories listed in Rule 803 mer~ as '''examples of statements, conforming 
with the requirements of this rule. " 
The constitutional caveat added by Crawford is that any testimonial 
statements offered against a criminal accused must exceed the due process 
standard. Crawford requires that either (I) the declarant testify and be subject to 
cross-examination at trial, (2) the declarant be unavailable to testify at trial but 
the accused had an earlier opportunity to cross-examine her about her statement, 
or (3) the declarant be unavailable to testify at trial and the court find that the 
accused procured her unavailability.45 Crawford necessitates the reevaluation of 
the definitions and boundaries of the previously firmly established hearsay 
exceptions, because even if a particular hearsay statement falls within one of 
those exceptions, if the statement is ''testimonial'' and it is offered against a 
criminal accused, it will be inadmissible unless the prosecution complies with 
Crawford. 
Given the first category of the three avenues for compliance with Crawford, 
this article will begin reevaluation of the existing Federal Rules of Evidence with 
Rule 801 (d)(1), regarding which prior statements of a testifying witness are 
admissible as substantive evidence. Because the witness is testifying at the trial, 
and Rule 801(d)(1) requires that she must be "subject to cross-examination 
concerning the statement,''''6 the Confrontation Clause poses no barrier here,47 
even ifher prior statements were testimonial. This article addresses one subset of 
Rule 801(d)(I)(B), which delimits the substantive admissibility of a testifying 
witness's out-of-court statements that are consistent with her testimony. 
III. RULE 801(D)(1)(B) 
Under the common law that was in effect just before the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, a witness's prior statements that were consistent with 
her testimony enjoyed no hearsay exception of their own. Rather, they were 
admissible only for the limited purpose of rehabilitating the credibility of a 
witness who had been impeached by the suggestion that the witness's memory 
had slipped or that the witness was fabricating her testimony, and then only if 
relevant for that purpose.48 Rule 801(d)(I)(B) made certain statements rebutting 
the latter form of impeachment admissible as substantive evidence. Most post-
Federal Rules of Evidence cases in the lower courts have permitted the use of 
statements not qualifying under the Rule, but nonetheless relevant to the 
44 4 DAVID W. LoUiSELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 437, at 446 (1980). 
45 See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text. 
46 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1). 
47 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
48 See infra Part II1.B. 
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witness's credibility, for the limited purpose of rehabilitation only, and not as 
substantive evidence. . 
A. The Confrontation Clause Poses No Bar to Admissibility of a Testifying 
Witness's Prior Consistent Statements 
By definition, in order for an out-of-court statement to be consistent with a 
witness's trial testimony, the witness must also testify at trial and thus be subject 
to cross-examination at trial. The Confrontation Clause, as most recently 
construed in Crawford, thus poses no obstacle to the admission of a testifying 
witness's prior consistent statements.49 The opponent may simultaneously 
contest the trustworthiness of the witness's prior consistent statements and the 
declarant's trial testimony through cross-examination of the declarant at trial. 
Similarly, as long as the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-
examination concerning the prior statement, neither the Confrontation Clause nor 
Rule 801(d)(I)(B) precludes extrinsic proof, as by document or by testimony of 
persons other than the declarant, of the declarant's prior consistent statements.50 
If other witnesses so testify, the opponent may cross-examine those witnesses as 
to their own bias, accuracy of perception, memory, and any other matters 
relevant to their credibility. 
There are, however, reasons other than the Confrontation Clause to limit the 
admissibility of a witness's prior consistent statements. We would rather hear 
the witness testifying from a live memory-and be able to cross-examine her live 
49 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
50 This procedure was followed in, for example, United States v. Trujillo, 376 F.3d 593, 609-10 
(6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Fulford, 980 F.2d 1110, 1114 (7th Cir. 1992). See, e.g., United 
States v. Hebeka, 25 F.3d 287, 291-92 (6th Cir. 1994) (The government proved the witness's 
statement through extrinsic evidence after the witness had testified. "Every other circuit [except 
the Seventh Circuit in West] which has addressed this issue permits third parties to testify about 
another witness's prior consistent statement .... Where, as here, the requirements ofthe rule are 
satisfied, the admission of a prior consistent statement through a third party on an important matter 
in dispute at trial should be permitted.") (citing United States v. Montague, 958 F.2d 1094, 1099 
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (listing six other circuits in accord); United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1576 
n.7 (lIth Cir. 1992); United States v. Piva, 870 F.2d 753, 758 (1st Cir. 1989»; United States v. 
Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304, 311 (4th Cir. 1979) (finding extrinsic proof of such statements was 
proper after declarant had testified and been impeached at trial). See also United States v. Copes, 
345 F.2d 723, 726 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (holding in a pre-Federal Rules of Evidence case that 
admitting extrinsic proof of declarant's prior consistent statements when she had testified and been 
cross-examined about the statements was not error). But see United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 
686-87 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding it was harmless error to permit extrinsic proof of statement after 
declarant had testified, but had not testified to statement; proof of statement must be elicited from 
declarant on redirect or in prosecution's case in rebuttal, so that he or she will be "subject to cross-
examination concerning the out-of-court declaration"). Professor Friedman argues, however, that 
substantive admissibility of prior statements that are generally consistent but add detail should not 
be permitted if the declarant does not assert these facts at trial because cross-examination will be 
seriously hampered as to those facts. Friedman, supra note 29, at 287-301,305-10,321. 
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memory-than simply be confined to what she said before. If her recollection is 
complete, there is no need to resort to her earlier statements. To admit all of a 
witness's prior consistent statements would consume a great deal of time and 
yield no particular benefit. 51 Additionally, to routinely admit a witness's prior 
consistent statements might encourage the manufacture of well-crafted 
statements by unethical witnesses, parties, or counsel. 52 
B. The Pre-Rule Common Law 
Before the codification of the Federal Rules of Evidence, there was no 
hearsay exception per se for prior consistent statements of a testifying witness. 
For his or her statements to be admitted as substantive evidence, they had to meet 
the requirements for some hearsay exception, such as that for excited utterances. 
Under the applicable common law, prior consistent statements that did not fall 
under such a hearsay exception could be admitted only for the limited purpose of 
rehabilitating the credibility of a witness who had been impeached by an 
opposing party.53 Of course, prior consistent statements were admissible for this 
limited purpose of rehabilitation only when they were helpful to the fact-finder 
because they logically rebutted the impeachment that had been undertaken. 
There were three situations where this criterion often was met. 
The first scenario arose when the witness was impeached by questions or 
evidence suggesting that her testimony was inaccurate because her memory had 
faded since the event in question. The proponent of her testimony then could 
. prove her prior consistent statements made significantly closer to the event. 54 
51 See FED. R. Evro. 801(d)(I) advisory committee's note (contrasting FED. R. Evro. 801(d)(I) with 
UNIF. R. EVID. 63(1) (1953), "which allows any out-of-court statement of a declarant who is present 
at the trial and available for cross-examination" (emphasis added)). 
52 See FED. R. Evro. 801(d)(I), advisory committee's note (stating an "unwillingness to 
countenance the general use of prior prepared statements as substantive evidence"), cited in Tome 
v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 162 (1995). 
53 See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 511-13 (chronicling evolution of common law rule 
from the admission of a witness's prior consistent statements without limitation through early 
1700's, to the admission for corroboration only, regardless whether declarant had been impeached, 
and finally, to the admission only after an attack on witness's credibility in the early 1800s); 
Edward D. Ohlbaum, The Hobgoblin of the Federal Rules of Evidence: An Analysis of Rule 
801 (d)(J)(B), Prior Consistent Statements and A New Proposal, 1987 BYU L. REv. 231, 234-42. 
54 E.g., Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 516 n.47 (citing Applebaum v. American Export 
lsbrandtsen Lines, 472 F.2d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1972); Felice v. Long Island R.R., 426 F.2d 192, 198 
n.6 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Keller, 145 F. Supp. 692, 695-97 (D.N.J. 1956); People v. 
Basnett, 8 Cal. Rptr. 804, 810-11 (Ct. App. 1960); Thomas v. Ganezer, 78 A.2d 539, 542 (Conn. 
1951); Openshaw v. Adams, 445 P.2d 663, 668-69 (Idaho 1968); Cross v. State, 86 A. 223, 227 
(Md. 1912); People v. Mann, 212 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); State v. Slocinski, 197 
A. 560, 562 (N.H. 1938); Jones v. Jones, 80 N.C. 246, 250 (1878) [1879]; 1 MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE § 47, at 178 n.18 (John W. Strong, ed., 4th ed. 1992) ("If the witness's accuracy of 
memory is challenged, it seems clear common sense that a consistent statement made shortly after 
the event and before he had time to forget, should be received in support.")); Michael H. Graham, 
Prior Consistent Statements: Rule 801 (d)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Critique and 
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Second, where the opponent suggested that the witness was lying at the trial 
due to her bias or improper motive, the courts routinely would admit the 
witness's consistent statements made prior to the date that the alleged bias or 
motive came into existence. 55 Post-motive statements that rebutted impeachment 
were also admitted by a number of courts. 56 
Third, if the impeachment was by proof of the witness's prior statement 
inconsistent with her trial testimony (which could imply either faded memory or 
subsequent fabrication), the prior consistent statement generally would need to 
precede the prior inconsistent statement in order to logically refute the 
impeachment so as to meet the relevancy requirement for admissibility.57 For 
instance, a witness who testified at trial that a civil defendant sped through a red 
traffic light and collided with the plaintiff's car might be impeached with her 
deposition taken a year before trial in which she said that she was not sure of the 
color of the light. The plaintiff then could prove the witness's statement to her 
husband on the evening following the accident that the defendant had run a red 
light. 
Proposal, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 575, 591, 605-06 & nn.99-102 (1979) (noting that prior consistent 
statements properly rebut such an attack "if the statement was made shortly after the event in 
question"). 
5S This "premotive" set of facts was found to exist in, for example, United States v. Dominguez. 
604 F.2d 304, 311 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding it was not error to permit a government agent to testify 
to prior statements of prosecution witness, when witness's cross-examination was rife with 
implications that he had improper motivation in testifying and that his testimony about two exhibits 
was fabricated recently, and the "prior consistent statements were made long before he belatedly 
produced the items in question"). It was found not to exist in, for example, United States v. Wei/. 
561 F.2d 1109, 1111 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (holding that because government failed to 
establish that a witness's prior consistent statement was given prior to government's offer of 
leniency, statement was admitted erroneously to rebut inference of improper motive resulting from 
offer). 
56 E.g., United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1274 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding it was not error to 
admit prior consistent statement where facts indicated that consistent statement was "independent 
of the alleged discrediting influence"); United States v. Gandy, 469 F.2d 1134, 1134-35 (5th Cir. 
1972) (per curiam); Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 104-05 (8th Cir. 1968). See State v. 
George, 30 N.C. 324, 328 (1848) (per curiam) (In dictum, the court discussed settled North 
Carolina law that provided that whether the statements were made before or after an alleged 
improper influence "applies more properly to the weight than to the competency of the testimony."). 
See also Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 525-27 (discussing pre-Tome split among the 
circuits after the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted regarding whether post-motive statements 
were admissible as substantive evidence or only for credibility purposes). See also infra note 109. 
57 See Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 439 (1836) (holding it was proper to have excluded a 
prior consistent statement that was made after the impeaching prior inconsistent statement and was 
not relevant to rebut impeachment); Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 518 & n.66 (citing 
Affronti v. United States, 145 F.2d 3, 7 (8th Cir. 1944); Gelbin v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 62 
F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1933); American Agric. Chern. Co. v. Hogan, 213 F. 416, 420-21 (1st Cir. 
1914); Baker v. People, 209 P. 791, 792-93 (Colo. 1922); Chicago City Ry. v. Matthieson, 72 N.E. 
443, 444-45 (Ill. 1904); 4 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1126 (Chadbourn rev. 
1972». Yet numerous courts disallowed even this use. See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 
518 & n.68. Professor Graham aptly describes the case law as "perplexing" and in "irreconcilable 
conflict." Graham, supra note 54, at 576. 
12 UMKC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:1 
Considerable case law gave the courts discretion t9 admit whatever prior 
statements by the witness they found would be helpful to the jury in evaluating 
the credibility of the witness's trial testimony, 58 as, for example, when the prior 
statement helped to explain a prior inconsistent statement or to deny its having 
been made. 59 Thus, a prior consistent statement close in time to, but nonetheless 
made after a prior inconsistent statement could be admitted. In the example just 
discussed, then, a statement given a week after the accident might be admitted, 
despite proof that immediately after the accident the witness said, "I don't want 
to get involved. I didn't see anything." 
The common law immediately preceding the adoption of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence would have required that the court give a limiting instruction, on 
request, that the prior consistent statement was to be considered only as to 
credibility of the witness and not as substantive proof.60 This limiting instruction 
was required even though the statement admitted was by definition consistent 
with, and thus cumulative of, the substantive testimony. 
C. The Federal Rule 
When the drafters of the federal rules considered the common law, they 
seemed to recognize that, because prior consistent statements are by definition 
consistent with the declarant's trial testimony, the requirement that a limiting 
instruction be given was likely futile and apt to result, at best, in confusion of the 
jury. Imagine a plaintiff's witness who has testified, "The traffic light was red 
when the blue van drove through it." The defense impeaches the witness with 
the fact that it has been three years since the accident, implying that she cannot 
remember what happened. The plaintiff on redirect proves the witness's 
S8 E.g., Gandy, 469 F.2d 1134 (per curiam); Hanger, 398 F.2d at 103-04; Copes v. United States, 
345 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 519 & n.72 (citing, inter 
alia, Nat'1 Postal Transp. Ass'n v. Hudson, 216 F.2d 193, 200 (8th Cir. 1954); Cafasso v. 
PennsylvaniaR.R., 169 F.2d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1948); Affronti, 145 F.2d at 7 (8th Cir. 1944); State 
v. Ouimette, 298 A.2d 124, 133-34 (R.I. 1972)). See also Kaneshiro v. United States, 445 F.2d 
1266, 1271 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1971) (prior consistent statements were properly ~dmitted to correct the 
prejudicial effect of the unfair cross-examination technique used by defendant's counsel, which 
falsely suggested that there were inconsistencies). 
S9 See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 519 & no. 70-71 (citing Felice, 426 F.2d at 197-98 (2d 
Cir. 1970); United States v. Fayette, 388 F.2d 728, 733-35 (2d Cir. 1968); Newman v. United 
States, 331 F.2d 968, 970-71 (8th Cir. 1964); United States v. Agueci; 310 F.2d 817, 834 (2d Cir. 
1962); United States v. Lev, 276 F.2d 605,608 (2d Cir. 1960); Calasso, 169 F.2d at 453; Affronti, 
145 F .2d at 7 ("[I]f some portions of a statement made by a witness are used on cross-examination 
to impeach him, other portions of the statement which are relevant to the subject matter about 
which he was cross-examined may be introduced in evidence to meet the force of the 
impeachment."); United States v. Weinbren, 121 F.2d 826, 828-29 (2d Cir. 1941); Sweazey v. 
Valley Transp., Inc., 107 P.2d 567, 572 (Wash. 1940)); Graham, supra note 54, at 594-602. 
60 See Copes, 345 F.2d at 726-27 (finding that under the circumstances, the instruction was 
adequate); Graham, supra note 54, at 578 (holding prior consistent statements admissible only as to 
credibility). See also FED. R. EVID. 105 (limiting instruction process' generally, under the federal 
evidence code). 
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statement one week after the accident, that "the light was red for the blue van." 
The judge informs the jury that it may not consider the latter statement as proof 
the light was red for the blue van, but only on the issue as to whether the witness 
was truthful when she testified at trial that the light was red for the blue van. 
The jurors hearing such an instruction might reasonably be heard to snicker, 
shake their heads, and murmur, like Mr. Bumble in Oliver Twist, "The law is a[n] 
ass.,,61 If the jury believes the witness's trial testimony, the prior consistent 
statement is merely cumulative.62 There is no need for a limiting instruction if 
the out-of-court statement duplicates already admitted substantive evidence. In 
recognition of this fact, the drafters of the Federal Rules undertook to make such 
prior consistent statements admissible as substantive evidence, thus obviating the 
need for a limiting instruction.63 
Unfortunately, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is underinclusive in several ways. First, it 
does not address all possible uses of prior consistent statements, but only those 
that follow impeachment by "an express or implied charge against the declarant 
of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.,,64 The Rule requires not 
only that there have been the type of impeachment suggesting "fabrication," but 
61 CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TwIST 399 (Oxford University Press 1961) (1838) (comment by Mr. 
Bumble when informed that the law presumes that the husband dominates the wife). 
62 See, e.g., Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 176 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by 
Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor and Thomas, JJ.) ("[E]ven in cases where the statement is admitted 
as significantly probative (in respect to rehabilitation), the effect of admission on the trial will be 
minimal because the prior consistent statements will (by their nature) do no more than repeat in-
court testimony."); United States v. Powell, 334 F.3d 42, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that ifit was 
error to admit prior consistent statement, error was harmless, as evidence was "wholly 
cumulative"); United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 29 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding error was 
harmless because "[a]t most the evidence was an extra helping of what the jury had heard before"); 
United States v. Hernandez, 227 F.3d 686, 696 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding error was harmless because 
it was cumulative); United States v. Lampkin, 159 F.3d 607, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding error 
was harmless because the evidence was merely cumulative); United States v. Albers, 93 F.3d 1469, 
1482-84 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding the Tome rule is retroactive and under the facts of the case, it 
was harmless error to admit post-motive consistent statements that "merely repeated" other 
testimony); United States v. White, 11 F.3d 1446, 1450-51 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding it was harmless 
error to admit statements that did not precede motive to fabricate); United States v. Simmons, 923 
F.2d 934, 942-44 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding any error in admitting witness's grand jury 
testimony was harmless); United States v. Mehra, 824 F.2d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding 
admission of fully corroborated prior consistent statement, even if error, was harmless because it 
added nothing of significance to government's case); Hamilton, 689 F.2d at 1274. But see United 
States v. Bolick, 917 F .2d 135 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding it was reversible error to admit extrinsic 
proof of prior consistent statements for rehabilitation and corroboration before their declarants had 
testified or been impeached). 
63 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(8) advisory committee's note ("The prior statement is consistent 
with the testimony given on the stand, and, if the opposite party wishes to open the door for its 
admission in evidence, no sound reason is apparent why it should not be received generally."). See 
also infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
64 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(l)(8). 
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also that it must suggest "recent fabrication.,,65 Further, the current paradigm for 
analyzing that category of statements, as established by the Supreme Court's 
majority of five in Tome, imposes a strict requirement that the prior consistent 
statement have been made "before the impeaching fact" for admission under the 
Rule.66 Thus, current Rule 801(d)(I)(B) results in the exclusion as substantive 
evidence of prior consistent statements that are post-motive, but that a jury would 
find helpful in assessing the impeachment undertaken, suggesting fabrication. 
Likewise, the current Rule excludes as substantive evidence prior consistent 
statements when the witness has been impeached as having a dulled memory, and 
the prior statements simply are from a time when the witness's memory was 
fresher than it is at trial. 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) states only: 
Prior consistent statements traditionally have been admissible to rebut 
charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive but not as 
substantive evidence. Under the rule they are substantive evidence. The 
prior statement is consistent with the testimony given on the stand, and, if the 
opposite party wishes to open the door for its admission in evidence, no 
sound reason is apparent why it should not be received generally. 67 
Yet this rationale applies equally to relevant post-motive and fresher memory 
statements that rebut the impeachment undertaken, but which Tome interpreted 
the language of the Rule to exclude. No doubt for this reason, Professor 
Friedman ventures that the Rule's underinclusiveness was unintentional: 
[T]he most plausible explanation appears to be that this was just a careless bit 
of drafting. The intention of the drafters seems to have been that if a prior 
consistent statement is admissible for rehabilitation it should be admissible 
substantively-that is, to prove the truth of what it asserts-notwithstanding 
the rule against hearsay. The language used by the Rule describes the most 
common, but not the exclusive, situation in which a prior consistent statement 
might be admitted for "rehabilitation.,,68 
In response to the underinclusiveness of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Chief Judge 
Jack Weinstein of the United States District for the Eastern District of New 
York,69 a leading evidence scholar, and many federaCo and state71 courts have 
65 [d. 
66513 U.S. 150 (1995). The Tome majority adopted the position advocated by Professor Ohlbaum 
in his article. Ohlbaum, supra note 53. For an example of how the lower courts currently apply 
Tome, see United States v. Bordeaux. 400 F.3d 548, 557 (8th Cir. 2005). 
67 FED. R. EVID. 80 I (d)(l)(B) advisory committee's note. 
68 Friedman, supra note 29, at 303-04. 
69 E.g., United States v. Obayagbona, 627 F. Supp. 329,335-38 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (endorsing liberal 
admission of prior consistent statements when offered only for rehabilitation and not as substantive 
proof, and urging that there is no need for requirement concerning time of statement). 
70 E.g., United States v. Stover, 329 F.3d 859, 866-69 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1018 
(2004); United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19,25-29 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Gluzman, 
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154 F.3d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 919-920 (4th Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Castillo, 14 F.3d 802, 806 (2d Cir. 1994) (proper rehabilitative use of prior 
consistent statements); United States v. White, II F.3d 1446, 1449 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Brennan, 798 F.2d 581, 587-89 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that although a prior consistent statement 
not antedating motive to lie was not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(I)(B), it 
was proper to admit statement to rehabilitate witness; prior consistent statements are more liberally 
admitted for rehabilitation than as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(I)(B); prior inconsistent 
statement can be put in "through specific testimony or through mischaracterization or suggestive or 
misleading cross-examination. The question is not whether the defense introduces a specific 
statement, but rather whether it has made a specific attack on a witness' credibility.") (citation 
omitted); United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a prior 
consistent statement made after prior inconsistent statement was admitted properly); United States 
v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 784-87 (4th Cir. 
1983) (finding that despite fact that authorities were split on question whether Rule 801(d)(I)(B) 
conditions admissibility of prior consistent statements corroborative of an impeached witness's 
testimony on the absence of a motive to fabricate at the time the prior statements were made, the 
rule clearly includes no such limitation) (court distinguished between use of statements for purpose 
of rehabilitation and as affirmative evidence); United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 70 (2d Cir. 
1979) (Friendly, J., concurring) (construing Fed. R. Evid. 102), ajJ'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 
424 (1981); Gonzalez v. DeTella, 918 F. Supp. 1214, 1222 (N.D. Ill. 1996). See United States v. 
Lozada-Rivera, 177 F.3d 98, 103 (1st Cir. 1999) (discussing split in authority regarding whether 
restraints of Rule 801(d)(I)(B) apply to all prior consistent statements); Bullock & Gardner, supra 
note 14, at 521-22 & nn.87-96 (citing cases); Friedman, supra note 29, at 319; Edward J. 
lmwinkelreid, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6 REv. LITIG. 129, 152-53 
(1987); Yvette Olstein, Pierre and Brennan: The Rehabilitation of Prior Consistent Statements, 53 
BROOK. L. REv. 515 (1987). Cf United States v. Collicot, 92 F.3d 973, 979-82 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(declining to reach question whether prior consistent statements that do not qualify under Rule 
801(d)(I)(B) may be admitted as substantive evidence under the "opened door" doctrine); 
Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 1985) (in habeas corpus proceedings, district 
court had held that, when defense impeached witness by showing that witness had made "deal," 
prosecution properly could show that part of deal was that witness had to pass a polygraph test (i. e., 
make a prior consistent statement); the appellate court affirmed on grounds that even if admission 
of evidence was error, it was not of constitutional dimension). Contra United States v. Miller, 874 
F.2d 1255, 1271-75 (9th Cir. 1989) (questioning whether a prior consistent statement is offered as 
substantive evidence or to rehabilitate, remains whether the statement has probative value apart 
from mere repetition; "we fail to see how a statement that has no probative value in rebutting a 
charge of 'recent fabrication or improper influence or motive' could possibly have probative value 
for the assertedly more 'limited' purpose of rehabilitating a witness") (citation omitted); United 
States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 516-18 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding it is reversible error to admit post-
motive consistent statements for purposes of corroboration). But see E. Desmond Hogan, Case 
Note, A Consistent Interpretationfor 80J(d)(J)(B) Prior Consistent Statements, 39 How. L.J. 819, 
839 (1996) ("[T]he [Tome] predate requirement applies when a prior statement is offered for 
rehabilitation purposes."). 
71 E.g., People v. Eppens, 979 P.2d 14,20-21 (Colo. 1999); Holmes v. State, 712 A.2d 554 (Md. 
1998) (holding statement admissible when state's witness testified that she did not "give any 
statement to police because Petitioner knew that she had witnessed the murder and she was 
frightened for her safety. She also testified that Petitioner visited her the day after the murder 
making her feel threatened." On cross-examination, defense counsel impeached her with her 
written statement to police following the shooting, stating that she did not see who shot the victim. 
On redirect, over objection, the court properly permitted the State to admit the witness's second 
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fallen back to the common law approach to fill the gaps left by the Rule; they 
admit helpful prior consistent statements for the limited purpose of use in 
assessing the declarant's credibility. The four dissenting justices in Tome 
endorsed the propriety of this approach,72 but the majority declined to address 
ie3 There being no Confrontation Clause bar to substantive use of a testifying 
witness's prior statements, as their reliability is subject to testing through cross-
examination,74 Rule 801(d)(1)(B) should be amended to make this unnecessarily 
complicated, two-tier approach obsolete, and permit substantive use of all such 
statements that would both be helpful to the fact-finder and also pass Rule 40375 
scrutiny as not unduly prejudicial, distracting, or cumulative. Such an 
amendment also would further Rule 611 's goals allowing the trial court to "make 
the interrogation [of witnesses] and presentation [of evidence] effective for the 
ascertainment of the truth ... [and] avoid needless consumption oftime.,,76 
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF RULE 801(D)(1)(B) 
Rule 80l(d)(1)(B) is underinclusiv:e. Its language and the result in Tome 
cut the jury off from substantive use of a testifying witness's prior consistent 
statements that would be helpful to it. The Tome rule usurps in part the jury's 
fact-finding role as to whether the witness has a motive to lie and, if so, when it 
arose and whether it affected the witness's trial testimony. An amended rule that 
broadens the substantive admissibility of a witness's prior statements consistent 
with her testimony, subject to exclusion in the court's discretion under Rule 403 
as unduly prejudicial or cumulative, is desirable. 
A. Shortcomings of the Present Rule: Underinclusiveness 
Rule 80l(d)(1)(B) is underinclusive in two significant ways. First, it fails 
altogether to address the use of prior consistent statements when the 
impeachment undertaken (whether by proof of the witness's prior inconsistent 
statement to the police, made two days after the shooting, identifying the defendant as the shooter) 
(pursuant to explicit provision of Md. Rule 5-616(c)(2) regarding rehabilitation of witnesses, see 
infra note 158); State v. Chew, 695 A.2d 1301 (N.J. 1997); State v. Brown, 969 P.2d 313, 325-26 
(N.M. 1998); Beartusk v. State, 6 P.3d 138, 145 (Wyo. 2000). 
72 513 U.S. 150, 169-76 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, c.J., and O'Connor and 
Thomas, n.). 
73 Id. at 167 ("Our holding is confined to the requirements for admission under Rule 
801(d)(1 )(8)."). 
74 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
75 FED. R. EVID. 403 (trial court may exclude relevant evidence "if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence"). See infra note 151. 
76 FED. R. EVID. 611(a). "The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of 
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (l) make the interrogation and presentation 
effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect 
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment." Id. 
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statement or otherwise, as by mere passage of time) is to suggest that the 
witness's memory has faded.77 
Further, its treatment of the type of impeachment it does address-by 
suggestion of fabrication by the witness-is also overly narrow for at least two 
reasons. Most importantly, the Rule's strict requirement, as co~strued in Tome, 
that in order to be substantively used the prior statement must precede an alleged 
motive to fabricate, provides the defense with a facile way to slam the door 
against statements that would be useful to the jury in determining what credence 
to give to the impeachment, simply by alleging any preexisting motive to 
fabricate. Tome's requirement works at all-and then only fairly well-when 
there is an objective fact that concededly causes such a motive (regardless 
whether it has affected the witness's testimony) and around which parameters of 
time may easily be placed. In those cases, Tome applies, not unreasonably, to 
permit only those consistent statements made before that objective event.78 
Such facts would include, for example, an employment relationship 
between the witness and a party during which the witness might have a motive to 
tailor her testimony to fit her employer's wishes. Another example would be the 
firing of the employee, after which she might have the opposite motive. Other 
objective facts concededly creating a !Dotive to lie might include friendship, 
business partnership, or a romantic relationship. But drawing a bright line as to 
when the relationship began may be difficult. 
77 See United States v. Bishop, 264 F.3d 535, 548 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding it is harmless error to 
admit witness's prior notes under Rule 801(d)(I)(B), when cross-examination merely challenged 
witness's memory); United States v. Khan, 821 F.2d 90, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that a prior 
consistent statement is admissible both as substantive evidence to rebut motive to fabricate and as 
rehabilitative evidence, with regard to impeachment by prior inconsistent statement); Baker v. 
Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 559 (6th Cir. 1978) (arguably stretching to characterize cross-
examination as to memory as an implication that witness made an earlier inconsistent statement, 
and therefore implying that his trial testimony was "a recent fabrication or result of an improper 
influence or motive," opening the door under Rule 801(d)(l)(B)). 
78 E.g., United States v. Wilson, 355 F.3d 358, 361-62 (5th Cir. 2003) (in this drug distribution case 
when a government witness testified pursuant to a plea bargain to having worked for the defendant 
in the distribution of drugs and cross-examination implied that plea bargain benefits gave witness 
motive to fabricate his testimony, the trial judge properly permitted the government to introduce a 
letter, which referred to similar facts, written by the witness three years before the plea bargain; the 
Court of Appeals explained, "A prior consistent statement need not rebut all motives to fabricate, 
but only the specific motive alleged at trial."); United States v. Stoecker, 215 F.3d 788, 791 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (holding that statements made several years before plea agreement were properly 
admitted); United States v. Allison, 49 M.J. 54 (C.M.A. 1998) (holding no abuse of discretion in 
admitting videotape of an early interview of child abuse victim by a social worker, which rebutted 
at least some of the alleged motives to fabricate, including coaching by various persons after the 
interview occurred); Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 263-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding 
that statement made before a plea bargain rebutted impeachment of motive to lie because of the 
plea bargain); Moody v. State, 827 S.W.2d 875, 894 n.ll (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (holding that 
child's statement prior.to tell!ng her mother of alleged sexual abuse rebutted impeachment that 
child had a motive to lie because of mother's prodding). 
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In a criminal case, such a motive objectively occurs when one person is 
either arrested or "caught with the goods" and that person implicates another, 
"bigger fish" in the crime.79 For example, in celebrity Martha Stewart's trial, her 
defense lawyers suggested on cross-examination of prosecution witness Douglas 
Faneuil that his testimony (which inculpated himself, his boss Peter Bacanovic, 
and Stewart) was given in an attempt to curry favor with the government. The 
trial judge ruled that the prosecution then could offer testimony as to Fanueil's 
prior consistent conversations with his friends, before any effort to plea bargain 
with the government. 80 
But reasonable minds may differ as to when an alleged motive to fabricate 
will have arisen. 81 A number of courts have found, for example, that post-arrest 
statements made to authorities before any discussion of plea bargaining were not 
made after an alleged motive to win favor with the prosecution.82 Thus, the 
Tome model does not ensure predictability or uniformity of result, and ultimately 
fails to further justice. 
When the existence of the improper motive, or of a fact that would create 
such a motive, is hotly disputed, Tome allows the mere self-serving allegation of 
fabrication to preclude answering that allegation by the substantive use of any of 
79 E.g., United States v. Trujillo, 376 F.3d 593, 609-11 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding it was harmless 
error to admit coconspirators' prior consistent statements, made during post-arrest interviews, 
which implicated the defendant as one of their employers in a drug business); United States v. 
Zapata, 356 F. Supp.2d 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). See also United States v. Esparza, 291 F.3d 1052 
(8th Cir. 2002) (holding defendant's exculpatory statement made to highway patrol upon discovery 
of drugs was properly excluded because motive to lie existed). 
80 Stewart Judge to Allow Evidence Backing Prosecution Witness, BALT. SUN, Feb. 18,2004, at 10. 
For a similar fact scenario, see Andrea F. Siegel, Jury Hears Account of Fatal Brawl, BALT. SUN, 
May 11,2005, at lB. After a witness for the prosecution had been impeached with the suggestion 
that he fabricated his story from the police report and that his account "surfaced only as prosecutors 
were weighing which off the six defendants [including the witness] to try first," the court permitted 
the witness's uncle to testify that the witness had told him the same account "from the start." 
81 United States v. Fulford, 980 F.2d 1110, 1114 (7th Cir. 1992). See infra notes 135-36. 
82 See United States v. Prieto, 232 F .3d 816, 819-22 (11 th Cir. 2000) (holding that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in finding that declarant had no motive to fabricate on the evening of his 
arrest, when the subject of declarant's cooperation had not been raised); United States v. Mincey, 
106 Fed. App'x 750 (2d Cir. 2004) (mem.) (holding it was not error to have admitted a government 
witness's prior consistent statement made "when she was initially questioned by government 
agents," as defendant failed to establish that witness had a motive to falsely implicate him at that 
time); United States v. Montague, 958 F.2d 1094, 1I00 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Wald, J., concurring); 
United States v. Khan, 821 F.2d 90, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1987) (fmding that witness's arrest did not 
create a motive to falsely implicate defendant when witness did not mention defendant upon 
witness's arrest, but four weeks later when entering a cooperation agreement, and defendant was 
not arrested until three months after that); United States v. Henderson, 717 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1983) 
(holding post-arrest pre-plea bargain statements admissible). See also Arizona v. Johnson, 351 
F.3d 988, 998-1000 (9th Cir. 2003) cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 254 (2004) (holding no abuse of 
discretion in fmding that an illegal immigrant's statement to a Border Patrol Agent about abuse by 
another agent was made before any motive to fabricate). See infra note 135. 
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the declarant's prior consistent statements. In this regard, the Tome model fails. 
As in Tome itself, an insuperable catch-22 is created. 
In Tome the alleged motive to lie was the child's desire to live with her 
mother. 83 This motive-the existence of which was not conceded-would have 
existed as soon as she was sent to live with her father. Yet, as it was alleged that 
when she went to live with her father was when the abuse began,84 there was no 
way that any of her prior consistent statements regarding abuse could have 
preceded the alleged motive to lie. Thus, under Tome, the mere allegation of the 
motive to lie foreclosed the admissibility under Rule 801(d)(I)(B) of evidence 
that the jury reasonably could have found find crucial in evaluating the existence 
and impact of the alleged motive. This undesirable result occurs even when the 
motive is not conceded to exist. 8S In an illogical, circular mode of reasoning, the 
mere allegation of the motive becomes a self-fulfilling end run against the 
witness, who is left defenseless against the accusation, except for her own 
protestations from the stand. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has found 
similarly circular the defense's argument that an informant's prior consistent 
statements, made after his arrest but before he had entered into a plea agreement, 
were inadmissible as being post-motive.86 Judge Erwin, writing for the panel, 
concluded that such an argument "effectively swallows the rule with respect to 
prior consistent statements made to government officers: by definition such 
statements would never be prior to the event of apprehension or investigation by 
the government which gave rise to a motive to falsity.,,87 
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is also underinclusive, even as to the one mode of 
impeachment it addresses, in its superfluous, explicit requirement that in order to 
open the door to substantive use of prior consistent statements, the impeachment 
undertaken must be an implied or express charge not simply of "fabrication or 
83 Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 153, 165 (1995). 
84 While discovery of sexual abuse by a spouse may lead to marital separation, abuse by the father 
often begins after the parents have separated for other reasons. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, 
Children at Risk: The Sexual Exploitation of Female Children After Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 
251, 253-56 (2001). See generally Thea Brown, Separated and Unmarried Fathers and the 
Courts: Fathers and Child Abuse Allegations in the Context of Parental Separation and Divorce, 
41 FAM. CT. REv. 367 (2003) (commenting that while sexual abuse is most commonly committed 
by a male, fathers are not the most common offenders). 
85 See Christopher A. Jones, Casenote, Clinging to History: The Supreme Court (Mis)Interprets 
Federal Rule of Evidence 80J(d)(J)(B) as Containing a Temporal Requirement, 29 U. RICH. L. 
REv. 459, 491 (1995). "[Under Tome,] allegations of fabrication that trigger the temporal 
requirement never have to be substantiated. Due to the lack of a substantiation requirement, the 
possibility of abuse is high." Id. Moreover, with a very young declarant, the option of admitting a 
prior statement as recorded recollection under Rule 803(5) is unlikely. Either the child declarant 
will not have recorded anything or, even if the person to whom the child spoke recorded her 
statement, a very young child is unlikely to be able to testify to the required foundational elements. 
Id. See also infra note 123. 
86 Henderson, 717 F.2d at 137. 
87 Id. at 139. 
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improper influence or motive" but of "recent fabrication or improper influence or 
motive."ss Why the adjective "recent" was emjloyed and what effect its 
inclusion has are not easy questions to answer.s A good part of the oral 
argument time in Tome was spent in attempts to resolve these matters.90 Perhaps 
the term was included simply as a result of the Rule's parroting, without careful 
analysis, the language of precedents such as Ellicott v. Pearl, in which Justice 
Story stated that "proof of an antecedent declaration ... may be admitted" when 
"a fabrication of a recent date" is alleged.91 . 
Whether "fabrication" needed to be modified in the Rule at all is 
questionable. Since fabrication is undesirable in a witness, no matter when it 
occurs or what for what motive, the added restriction to fabrication from an 
88 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(I)(B) (emphasis added). Maryland's corollary rule, for example, deletes 
the word "recent." MD. RULE 5-802.1 (b). 
89 See, e.g., People v. Singer, 89 N.E.2d 710, 711 (N.Y. 1949) ("[W]e think that 'recent' as so used 
[in the pre-Rules case law], has a relative, not an absolute meaning. It means, we think, that the 
defense is charging the witness not with mistake or confusion, but with making up a false story well 
after the event. 'Recently fabricated' means the same thing as fabricated to meet the exigencies of 
the case.") (citations omitted); Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. ISO (1995) (No. 93-6892) 
("By its express terms, [Rule 801(d)(I)(B)] is limited to prior consistent statements that rebut the 
suggestion that the witness's trial testimony reflects a change in position."). 
Let us put aside the argument made by the Government in Tome that "recent" is 
meant only to modify 'fabrication.' Though the argument is not utterly implausible, 
neither is it persuasive, and Justice Breyer's formulation-that the statement must 
show "that the witness did not recently fabricate his testimony as a result of an 
improper influence or motive"-seems useful. Even on this reading, however, 
"recent" is notoriously ambiguous. If taken literally, it seems to address the temporal 
relation of the fabrication, influence, or motive to the trial, not to the statement. 
Moreover, it seems clear that the word cannot be taken literally, in the dictionary 
sense of "occurring at a time immediately before the present." Thus "recent" should 
be given a construction that fits the rehabilitation idea underlying the Rule. In my 
view, "arising recently enough that the prior statement retains substantial rebuttal 
value" satisfies this standard and does not distort the language. In most cases-but 
not in all-this construction would be equivalent to "arising after the statement was 
made." 
Friedman, supra note 29, at 314-15 (footnotes omitted); Graham, supra note 54, at 582-83, 614 
("recent" is "superfluous," and means only "any time after the event"). 
90 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Tome, 513 U.S. 150, available at 1994 WL 665263. 
91 See Tome, 513 U.S. at 156 ("As Justice Story explained: '[w]here the testimony is assailed as a 
fabrication of a recent date, . . . in order to repel such imputation, proof of the antecedent 
declaration of the party may be admitted.'" (quoting Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 439, 9 
L.Ed. 475 (1836»). See also id. at 159-60 (citing Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 104 (8th 
Cir. 1968»; Ohlbaum, supra note 53, at 245 ("Rule 801(d)(l)(B) employs the precise language-
'[rebutting charges] of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive'-consistently used in the 
panoply of pre-l 97 5 decisions."». 
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"improper influence or an improper motive" is redundant92-and, if somehow not 
redundant, it is unnecessarily narrowing. As to the recency requirement, perhaps 
it was mistakenly thought that were the alleged fabrication not recent, it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to find a consistent statement that logically rebutted 
the fabrication. But, when closely evaluated, the cases do not support such a 
restriction. As Judge Bullock noted, "An attack on a witness's memory often, 
but not always, includes a charge of recent fabrication.,,93 
Indeed, the Rule's recency requirement seems. to have been read as 
superfluous.94 If, for example, the Tome Court had found the recency 
requirement to be significant, it could have rested its decision of inadmissibility 
under 80l(d)(1)(B) on the ground that the child's alleged fabrication was not 
"recent." The Court did not do so. It also could have chosen to read the 
disjunctive use of "or improper influence or motive" as providing an additional 
way of opening the door under Rule 80 1 (d)(1)(B), other than "recent 
fabrication-an additional way that would not be modified by "recent." 
Instead, despite the fact that the Tome majority's opinion,95 the 
concurrence,96 and the dissent,97 repeatedly quote or refer to the modifier 
"recent," all three opinions seem to read both "recent" and the first "or" out of 
the Rule,98 so that the Rule in substance connotes merely "fabrication stemming 
from either an improper influence or an improper motive." 
92 See Graham, supra note 54, at 585 ('''influence' is superfluous, and an 'improper' motive is any 
motive that tends to induce the witness to do anything but tell the truth"). 
93 Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 515 n.46. 
Although an attack on a witness's memory may include a charge of purposeful 
deception, such an attack does not always do so. For example, an attack charging 
inaccurate memory by showing the witness's simple Jorgetfulness or confusion may 
be made without charging purposeful deception. Common-law courts, however, often 
seemed to treat "recent fabrication" as a term of art, including non-purposeful 
deception within its definition. Other courts, in admitting prior consistent statements 
to rebut attacks on a witness's memory, recognized some distinction between such 
attacks and a charge of recent fabrication. These courts reasoned that such attacks 
created situations that were 'sufficiently analogous' to the cases admitting prior 
consistent statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication. 
See id. at 517 & nn.58-59 (footnotes omitted). 
94 See supra note 89. 
95 E.g., 513 U.S. at 156, 159 ("recent fabrication or improper influence or motive"). 
96Id. at 168 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("recent fabrication or improper motive, but not ... that the 
witness' memory is playing tricks"). 
97 /d. at 169 (Breyer, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor and Thomas, JJ.) ("recent 
fabrication or improper influence or motive"). 
98 E.g., id. at 158, 159 ("fabrication or improper influence or motive"); id. at 162-63 (the existence 
of "an improper influence or motive"). The majority in Tome first speaks of the two elements-
fabrication and improper influence or motive--as synonymous, a "requirement that the consistent 
statements must have been made before the alleged influence, or motive to fabricate, arose." Id. at 
158. The majority then retreats again to the disjunctive format. Id. ("Impeachment by charging 
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B. The Unsatisfactory Stopgap of Limited Admissibility 
The lower courts have responded to Rule 801(d)(I)(B)'s shortcomings by 
falling back to the common law approach with regard to relevant, helpful 
statements that do not fall within Tome's parameters, and admitting them with a 
limiting instruction.99 This stopgap approach is unsatisfactory and inadequate for 
two reasons. First, limiting instructions are confusing and likely ineffective. 100 
Second, this approach requires the exclusion of such prior consistent statements 
if the court finds that the jury will be unduly tempted to use them as substantive 
evidence. 
This result is particularly problematic in cases where a key witness is 
vulnerable in the courtroom and easil~ confused on cross-examination because, 
for example, of either extreme youth 1 1 or advanced age. Under current law, if 
the declarant's accuracy is crucial to the case and the declarant's in-court manner 
is weak, the jury cannot use her prior consistent statements as substantive 
that the testimony is a recent fabrication or results from an improper influence or motive is, as a 
general matter, capable of direct and forceful refutation through introduction of out-of-court 
consistent statements that predate the alleged fabrication, influence, or motive." (emphasis added)). 
This juxtaposition suggests that the majority is using "or" to link terms it is using as synonyms. 
The majority also quotes Deans Wigmore and McCormick, both of whom refer only to charges of 
"bias" and such. Id. at 156 ("McCormick and Wigmore stated the rule in a more categorical 
manner. '[l1he applicable principle is that the prior consistent statement has no relevancy to refute 
the charge unless the consistent statement was made before the source of the bias, interest, 
influence or incapacity originated. '" (citing E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 49, p. 105 (2d ed. 
1972); 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1128 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1972) ("'A consistent statement, at a 
time prior to the existence of a fact said to indicate bias ... will effectively explain away the force 
of the impeaching evidence .... "') ( emphasis omitted))). The dissent, too, refers to a witness who 
"recently fabricate[s] his testimony as a result of an improper influence or motive." Tome, 513 
U.S. at 170 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor and Thomas, II.). 
99 See supra notes 69-71. 
100 E.g., United States v. Castillo, 14 F.3d 802 (2d Cir. 1994). See supra text accompanying notes 
60-63; see infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
101 See, e.g., Lawson v. State, 865 A.2d 617, 631 (Md. App. 2005), cer!. granted, 2005 Md. LEXIS 
271 (Md., May 12, 2005). 
Id. 
"[A] young child can be easily intimidated into not testifying about [such] offenses .. 
.. " State v. Benwire, 98 S.W.3d 618,624 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). For that reason and 
others, "as a general phenomenon, child abuse victims frequently recant their initial 
reports of abuse." Yount v. State, 99 Md. App. 207, 210, 636 A.2d 50 (1994). 
Indeed, it has been observed that a child's out-of-court statements may "be more 
reliable than the child's testimony at trial, which may suffer distortion by the trauma 
of the courtroom setting or become contaminated by contacts and influences prior to 
trial." Benwire, 98 S.W.3d at 624 (citation and emphasis omitted). That is why, we 
hold, that any conflicts between Nigha's out-of-court statements and her in-court 
testimony do not render her out-of-court statements inadmissible, but rather present a 
question of credibility to be resolved by the jury. 
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evidence. Under Tome, this holds true when the opponent's allegation that the 
witness has a motive to lie is either not based on a fact that the witness concedes 
to be true or cannot be traced to a determinable time before which a relevant 
prior statement could possibly have been made. 102 Current Rule 801(d)(I)(B), as 
construed in Tome, excludes the substantive use of statements that the jury might 
find-and many lower courts have found-helpful to assess what effect, if any, 
to give the impeachment. 
Where a jury might find that a witness's prior consistent statements add 
probative value beyond the witness's in-court testimony, the courts currently are 
constrained to exclude them, for fear that the jury might not follow an instruction 
limiting their use to evaluating the credibility of the witness's trial testimony.lo3 
This unnecessarily complicated approach should be jettisoned in favor of making 
such relevant statements admissible under Rule 801(d)(I)(B). 
This is not to suggest that any impeachment would open the door to prior 
consistent statements. Such statements are not relevant to rebut impeachment by 
evidence of bad character; the fact that someone who would not hesitate to lie. 
said the same thing before that he claims in court proves nothing with regard to 
the probative value that should be given to his in-court testimony. 104 A witness's 
prior consistent statements may be relevant not only when the method of 
impeachment is fabrication (as currently addressed by Rule 801(d)(1)(B)~6 but 
also when the method of impeachment is prior inconsistent statement 5 or 
102 See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text. 
103 See supra note 6. 
104 See Tome, 513 U.S. at 158. 
Id. 
A consistent statement that predates the motive is a square rebuttal of the charge that 
the testimony was contrived as a consequence of that motive. By contrast, prior 
consistent statements carry little rebuttal force when most other types of impeachment 
are involved. McCormick § 49, p. 105 ("When the attack takes the form of 
impeachment of character, by showing misconduct, convictions or bad reputation, it is 
generally agreed that there is no color for sustaining by consistent statements. The 
defense does not meet the assault" (footnote omitted»; see also 4 Wigmore § 1131, p. 
293 ("The broad rule obtains in a few courts that consistent statements may be 
admitted after impeachment of any sort-in particular after any impeachment by cross-
examination. But there is no reason for such a loose rule." (footnote omitted». 
105 Compare, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that an 
officer's prior consistent statements to his partner, prior to his post-incident report which omitted 
certain details was admitted properly) with United States v. Toney, 161 F.3d 404 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that the trial court properly excluded a coconspirator's statements that were made six 
months after her arrest, when the coconspirator and ringleader had pled guilty and testified that she 
had duped the defendant who had no knowledge of alleged fraud; the government impeached 
coconspirator with her inconsistent statement made upon her arrest, and argued that coconspirator's 
"motive to lie" to exculpate her friend, the defendant, arose after the scheme began to unravel and 
government charged defendant). 
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memory loss. As Justice Breyer, writing for the four dissenting justices in Tome, 
explained, 
The majority is correct in saying that there are different kinds of categories of 
prior consistent statements that can rehabilitate a witness in different ways, 
includinffi statements (a) placing a claimed inconsistent statement in 
context; 6 (b) showing that an inconsistent statement was not made; (c) 
indicating that the witness' memory is not as faulty as a cross-examiner has 
claimed; and (d) showing that the witness did not recently fabricate his 
testimony as a result of an improper influence or motive .... But, I do not see 
where, in the existence of several categories, the majority can find the 
premise, which it seems to think is important, that the reason the drafters 
singled out one category (category (d)) was that category's special probative 
force in respect to rehabilitating a witness .... I doubt the premise because, 
as McCormick points out, other categories of prior consistent statements 
(used for rehabilitation) also, on occasion, seem likely to have strong 
probative force. What, for example, about such statements introduced to 
rebut a charge of faulty memory (category (c) above)? McCormick says 
about such statements: "If the witness's accuracy of memory is challenged, it 
seems clear common sense that a consistent statement made shortly after the 
event and before he had time to forget, should be received in support." 
Would not such statements (received in evidence to rehabilitate) often turn 
out to be highly probative as well?I07 
The dissent argued that the real reason for Rule 80l(d)(1)(B) was a practical 
one: the inefficacy of limiting instructions: 
Juries have trouble distinguishing between the rehabilitative and substantive 
use of the kind of prior consistent statements listed in Rule SOI(d)(I)(B). 
Judges may give instructions limiting the use of such prior consistent 
statements to a rehabilitative purpose, but, in practice, juries nonetheless tend 
to consider them for their substantive value. See 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 
Weinstein's Evidence ~ SOI(d)(l)(B)[OI], p. SOl-ISS (1994) ("As a practical 
matter, the jury in all probability would misunderstand or ignore a limiting 
instruction [with respect to the class of prior consistent statements covered by 
the Rule] anyway, so there is no good reason for giving one"). It is possible 
that the Advisory Committee made them "nonhearsay" for that reason, i.e., as 
a concession "more of experience than of logic." Advisory Committee's 
Notes on Fed.Rule Evid. 801(d)(l)(B), 28 U.S.C. App., p. 773 .... On this 
106 See, e.g., United States v. Denton, 246 F.3d 784, 789 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Simonelli, 
237 F.3d 19, 25-29 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding prior consistent statements placing other prior 
inconsistent statements in context were admitted properly; admission of others that went beyond 
that purpose was harmless error); Engbretsen v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 21 F.3d 721, 730 (6th Cir. 
1994) (holding that prior consistent statements inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(I)(B) may be 
admissible for a limited purpose if they rehabilitate the witness "by clarifying or explaining his 
prior statements"). 
107 513 U.S. at 170 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor and Thomas, 
JJ.) (citation omitted). 
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rationale, however, there is no basis for distinguishing between premotive 
and postmotive statements, for the confusion with respect to each would very 
likely be the same. 108 
The dissenters would have applied the crucible of logical relevance, rather 
than a rigid pre-or-post-motive standard with regard to admissibility under the 
Rule, as some .post-motive statements will be relevant to rebut the attempted 
impeachment. 10 
108 Id. at 171. See, e.g., United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19,27 (1st Cir. 2001) ("[T]he line 
between substantive use of prior statements and their use to buttress credibility on rehabilitation is 
one which lawyers and judges draw but which may well be meaningless to jurors."); SALTZBURG, 
supra note 14, § 801-02[4][c] at 801-38 ("A line between substantive and rehabilitative use of these 
statements may well be of little use. Yet this is the line drawn by the Rule .... "). See also infra 
notes 113, 132-33. 
109 Tome, 513 U.S. at 172-73 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor and 
Thomas, JJ.) 
A postmotive statement is relevant to rebut, for example, a charge of recent 
fabrication based on improper motive, say, when the speaker made the prior statement 
while affected by a far more powerful motive to tell the truth. A speaker might be 
moved to lie to help an acquaintance. But, suppose the circumstances also make clear 
to the speaker that only the truth will save his child's life. Or, suppose the postmotive 
statement was made spontaneously, or when the speaker's motive to lie was much 
weaker than it was at trial. In these and similar situations, special circumstances may 
indicate that the prior statement was made for some reason other than the alleged 
improper motivation; it may have been made not because of, but despite, the improper 
motivation. Hence, postmotive statements can, in appropriate circumstances, directly 
refute the charge of fabrication based on improper motive, not because they bolster in 
a general way the witness' trial testimony, ... but because the circumstances indicate 
that the statements are not causally connected to the alleged motive to lie. For another 
thing, the common-law premotive rule was not as uniform as the majority suggests. A 
minority of courts recognized that postmotive statements could be relevant to rebut a 
charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive under the right 
circumstances. 
Id. (citations omitted). Judge Bullock elaborates, exploring situations where post-motive 
statements have "rebuttal force or related value," including: (1) "when a separate motive to tell the 
truth or to make a different statement exists at the statement's making;" (2) "when the charged 
motive is contextually weak. For example, consider a situation where a criminal defendant alleges 
that a large number of police officers are conspiring to frame the defendant. The defendant 
impliedly charges that the officers are lying on the stand about their investigation, and charges that 
the improper motivation arose as soon as each officer arrived on the crime scene. Should such a 
charge prevent the officers from being rehabilitated by showing that they made prior consistent 
statements from the beginning of their investigation? Would not their consistency tend to show the 
absence of such a conspiracy even. though the prior consistent statements were made after the 
alleged conspiracy began?;" (3) the spontaneity of particular statements may refute the impact of a 
charged motive; (4) "A declarant's ability to tell a complicated or unique story more than once 
may, in some instances, indicate reliability and be relevant. Child sex-abuse cases are one example 
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Indeed the Tome majority conceded, "[T]here may arise instances when 
out-of-court statements that postdate the alleged fabrication have some probative 
force in rebutting a charge of fabrication or improper influence or motive .... ,,110 
The majority saw no constitutional impediment to broadening the Rule in the 
way proposed in this article, as Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority 
reasoned: 
If consistent statements are admissible without reference to the time frame we 
find imbedded in the Rule, there appears no sound reason not to admit 
consistent statements to rebut other forms of impeachment as well . . . . 
Congress could have adopted [the] rule [sought by the Government in Tome] 
with ease, providing, for instance, that 'a witness' prior consistent statements 
are admissible whenever relevant to assess the witness' truthfulness or 
accuracy. I I I 
The majority concluded that it was hamstrung by the language of the 
current Rule. Tome in no way precludes amendment of the Rule so as to overrule 
the result reached in that case and follow instead the path urged by the dissent. 
When the Advisory Committee made its choice for Rule 801 (d)(1), it 
acknowledged (as pointed out by Justice Breyer in dissent in Tome) that it was a 
''judgment ... more of experience than of logic.,,112 The experience referred to 
apparently was the inutility of the limiting instruction. Experience tells us that 
that inutility extends to all of a witness's prior consistent statements1l3 so there is 
of this situation. A young child's postmotive description of the details of sexual abuse can offer 
some value and indicate that the child is not fabricating the story. A jury is able to weigh these 
possibilities in context and should be allowed to do so;" and (5) "When a witness testifies as to his 
or her own prior consistent statement, the jury's ability to view the witness testifying offers more 
than the statement itself. It gives the jurors another opportunity to observe the witness and judge 
the witness's credibility." Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 535-37. See supra note 56. See 
also Lesley E. Daigle, Note, Tell Me No Timing Rule and I'll Tell You No Lies: Why a Child's 
Prior Consistent Statements Should Be Admissible Without a Pre-Motive Requirement-A Critique 
of Tome v. United States, 17 REv. LITIG. 91, 95,104-10 (Winter 1988) (reviewing social science 
literature and concluding that "repeated consistent statements of young children have a particular 
reliability, independent of whether they were made pre- or post-motive"); Friedman, supra note 29, 
at 310-13 (explaining post-motive statements may rebut the charge of improper influence if the 
influence may well have had less impact at the time of the prior statement than it would have at 
trial; the earlier influence could be lesser, for example, (1) because "a grudge, or other improper 
influence, ... builds over time;" or (2) because of "the circumstances or manner in which the 
witness made the statement," such as in a conversation with an intimate). See also supra note 56. 
110 513 U.S. at 158. 
111/d. at 159. 
112 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) advisory committee's note. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
113 Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 540-41. 
Distinctions between the substantive and non substantive use of prior consistent 
statements are normally distinctions without practical meaning. Juries have a very 
difficult time understanding an instruction about the difference between substantive 
and nonsubstantive use. This is likely a large part of the reason that the drafters of 
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no reason to preclude the substantive use of such statements when they would be 
sufficiently helpful to the trier of fact. Rule 801 (d)(1 )(B) should be amended to 
permit the substantive use of a witness's prior consistent statements that the trial 
court finds, as a preliminary matter under Rule 104(a), can logically be seen to 
rebut the impeachment undertaken. If that requirement is met, the court 
nonetheless in its discretion may exclude the evidence pursuant to Rule 403, and 
should apply that Rule to exclude evidence that is only marginally relevant or 
that is unduly repetitious. 
This approach may be criticized on the ground that it provides for judicial 
discretion, under Rules 80 1 (d)(1)(B), 403, and 611, which decreases 
predictability. 114 Yet the current standard itself creates unpredictability,1I5 as 
Rule 801(d)(l)(B) provided that evidence that meets the Rule's requirements is 
admissible substantively. It makes little sense to differentiate prior consistent 
statements with a cumbersome time-line rule in regard to the statements' admission as 
substantive evidence while also allowing the admission of statements rejected by such 
a rule when juries normally do not make such differentiations. Experience shows that 
jurors are adept at determining the weight to be given to a witness's testimony and can 
easily recognize the interest a witness has in the matter about which he or she 
testified, including any motive that could affect the witness's credibility. In 
recognition of this, the Federal Rules should explicitly provide that all prior consistent 
statements, when admissible to rehabilitate, are admissible as substantive evidence. 
The weight given these statements would then be for the jury to determine. 
[d. See supra notes 62-63, 100, 108 and accompanying text. 
114 See Tome, 513 U.S. at 165. 
[d. 
The statement-by-statement balancing approach advocated by the Government and 
adopted by the Tenth Circuit creates the precise dangers the Advisory Committee 
noted and sought to avoid: It involves considerable judicial discretion; it reduces 
predictability; and it enhances the difficulties of trial preparation because parties will 
have difficulty knowing in advance whether or not particular out-of-court statements 
will be admitted. 
115 See id. at 165-66 (conceding, "We are aware that in some cases it may be difficult to ascertain 
when a particular fabrication, influence, or motive arose."); Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 
537. 
rnhis potential uncertainty does not outweigh the need to allow the jury to consider 
relevant matters. Moreover, rejecting the time-line rule would leave no more 
uncertainty than is present with the current rule. The parties cannot know exactly how 
the court will rule in regard to relevancy or the premotive or postmotive status of a 
prior consistent statement. This is particularly evident in the many co-defendant-
turned-state's-evidence cases. Whether the trial court will fmd that the co-defendant's 
motive arose when he or she was first approached by the government, after a deal was 
put on paper, or at some other time, seems nearly impossible to predict ahead of the 
ruling. Similarly, witnesses' uncertainty of dates and wavering testimony will often 
leave pre-trial predictions on the admissibility of a prior consistent statement difficult. 
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reasonable minds can differ as to the date when a motive to fabricate arose. The 
proposed standard merely adds the flexibility necessary for assessment of 
helpfulness,116 a test that the courts already routinely apply in the lay and expert 
opinion arenas.1I7 The trial judge should be able to admit, without a limiting 
[d. (footnote omitted); Friedman, supra note 29, at 316-18. See also supra notes 81-82. 
116 See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 511 ("A more flexible approach, one that takes 
account of the realities ofajury trial, is needed."); id. at 539. 
The parties, and the jury, would be better served if the court could consider the 
admissibility of a proffered prior consistent statement in relation to all of the 
circumstances of the particular case. When considering the admissibility of prior 
consistent statements, courts' attention should be directed toward the charged motive, 
its context, and all of its characteristics, not merely the motive's alleged birthday. 
When the characteristics and context of a prior consistent statement, including a 
postmotive prior consistent statement, indicate that the statement is relevant to the 
juries' consideration of a witness's credibility, or to other relevant issues, the 
statement should be admissible. 
[d. See infra note 151. 
117 See supra notes 17-18. As the dissenting opinion in Tome explains: 
[T]here is no indication in any of the cases that trial judges would, or· do, find it 
particularly difficult to administer a more flexible rule in this [Rule 801(d)(I)(B)] 
context. And, there is something to be said for the greater authority that flexibility 
grants the trial judge to tie rulings on the admissibility of rehabilitative evidence more 
closely to the needs and circumstances of the particular case. 1 J. Weinstein & M. 
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ~ 401[01], pp. 401-8 to 401-9 (1994) ("A flexible 
approach ... is more apt to yield a sensible result than the application of a mechanical 
rule") ... . 
This Court has acknowledged that the Federal Rules of Evidence worked a change in 
common-law relevancy rules in the direction of flexibility. See Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). 
. . . The Rules direct the trial judge generally to admit all evidence having "any 
tendency" to make the existence of a material fact "more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence." Fed. Rules Evid. 401, 402. The judge may 
reject the evidence (assuming compliance with other rules) only if the probative value 
of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its tendency to prejudice a party or 
delay a trial. Rule 403. The codification, as a general matter, relies upon the trial 
judge's administration of Rules 401, 402, and 403 to keep the barely relevant, the time 
wasting, and the prejudicial from the jury. See, e.g., Abel, supra at 54, 105 S.Ct., at 
470 ("A district court is accorded a wide discretion in ... assessing the probative 
value of [proffered evidence], and weighing any factors counseling against 
admissibility"); 1 Weinstein's Evidence, supra ~ 401[01] (discussing broad discretion 
accorded trial judge); 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 
5162 (1978 and 1994 Supp.) .... 
Daubert suggests that the liberalized relevancy provisions of the Federal Rules can 
supersede a pre-existing rule of relevance, at least where no compelling practical or 
logical support can be found for the pre-existing rule. It is difficult to find any strong 
2005] POST-CRA WFORD: PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS 29 
. instruction, a witness's prior consistent statements that the jury would reasonably 
find to be helpful and that are not unduly cumulative. If post-motive statements 
are occasionally admitted under this test, the opponent may impeach them by 
arguing that the witness's motive to lie already existed at the time of the 
statement. 
C. The Current Rule Creates an Insurmountable Barrier for Alleged Child 
Abuse Victims 
Tome has had a "devastating effect" on sexual child abuse prosecutions.1I8 
Child abuse defendants often argue that the child fabricated the allegations of 
abuse or that the child was coached to fabricate them. 119 Where the defendant 
had a parental or quasi-parental relationship with the child, such as in Tome 
itself, defendants also often allege that the child was angry because the defendant 
was a disciplinarian,120 or because the child wanted to live somewhere other than 
with the defendant for some other reason. 12I Such a motive would naturally run 
throughout the entire time that the child knew or lived with the defendant. By 
requiring that, in order to be admissible under 801(b)(1)(B), the child's prior 
consistent statements must precede the alleged improper motive, Tome creates an 
insurmountable catch-22. 12 The child would have had no ability to report abuse 
by the defendant before she knew the defendant or lived with the defendant, as 
practical or logical considerations for making the premotive rule an absolute condition 
of admissibility here. Perhaps there are other circumstances in which categorical 
common-law rules serve the purposes of Rules 401, 402, and 403, and should, 
accordingly, remain absolute in the law. But... this case, like Daubert, does not 
present such a circumstance. 
513 U.S. at 173-75 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.]., and O'Connor and Thomas, 
JJ.). 
liS See Brief for the States of Ohio, et aI., as Amici Curiae iIi Support of Respondent, Tome v. 
United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995) (No. 93-6892). 
Id. 
[T]he amici States would stress that the "pre-motive" restriction which Petitioner 
seeks to read into Rule 801(d)(I)(B) could have a devastating effect on efforts to 
prosecute charges of sexually abusing a child. As this Court recognized in Craig, the 
serious difficulties of obtaining testimony from victims of child abuse, and of sexual 
abuse in particular, in the traumatic setting of a courtroom trial should not be 
minimized. Especially in the case of young children, spontaneous or otherwise 
reliable statements made outside the courtroom often can provide useful and quite 
probative evidence as to the actual facts of the case. 
119 See, e.g., Tome, 513 U.S. at 153, 165. 
120 See, e.g., Churchfield v. State, 769 A.2d 313 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (defendant made such 
an allegation). 
121 See, e.g., Tome, 513 U.S. at 153, 165. 
122 See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. 
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the case may be. Moreover, as in Tome the defendant may easily charge such a 
motive, but need not prove convincingly that it existed, in order to foreclose the 
admissibility of "pre-motive" statements.123 Until Tome is overruled by an 
amendment to Rule 801(d)(I)(B), the jury will be deprived of the ability to use 
those statements that it might reasonably find helpful as substantive evidence. 
Imagine being seated on a jury in a case where the prosecution alleges that a 
small child was physically or sexually abused by his custodial parent. Assume 
that there is physical evidence of abuse. Assume further that in fact the child was 
abused and that he eventually confides in his non-custodial parent, and in a 
pediatrician to whom that parent takes him. The pediatrician reports the abuse to 
the prosecutor who charges the custodial parent. At trial, approximately a year 
and a half after the alleged abuse, the child is tongue-tied. The prosecutor is 
permitted to ask leading questions, to which the child accedes with apparent 
hesitation. 
On cross-examination, the defense lawyer intimates that the allegations are 
false and that the child fabricated them--either on his own or at the non-custodial 
parent's urging-so as to be with the non-custodial parent, who does not 
discipline the child. 
Would it be helpful to you as a juror to hear the non-custodial parent, the 
pediatrician, or both, testify to the child's earlier statements, which are consistent 
with the child's halting testimony at trial? Would the direct and cross-
examination of these witnesses be helpful to you in evaluating what weight to 
give the respective allegations of abuse and of fabrication? If the testimony of 
either or both of these witnesses would be helpful to a reasonable jury, the judge 
should be able to admit that testimony.124 
In this situation, it is improper for the judge to decide, as presently 
mandated by Tome, that the motive existed, when it existed, and that it affected 
the child's reports of abuse. Those are jury questions,125 and the jury ought to 
123 Thirteen states filed an amicus brief in support of the United States in Tome, arguing: 
In the context of such cases, the defense will always be able to devise some alleged 
motive for the child to lie. In cases of abuse, it may well be simply that the child 
would prefer not to have contact with the defendant, which would certainly be 
expected in such cases, or perhaps that the child is alleged to desire attention. See, 
e.g., State v. Robinson, 611 A.2d 852 (Vt. 1992). Such alleged motives to lie, which 
may be weak motives at best or may have little or no obvious or recent origin, could 
readily permit the defense to remove any possibility that prior consistent statements 
made by the child victim -- no matter how probative the circumstances in which they 
were made -- could be admitted at trial. Such a result would plainly disserve the 
substantial state interest, recognized in many decisions of this Court, in protecting the 
physical and psychological well-being of children. 
Brief for the States of Ohio, et aI., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Tome v. United States, 
513 U.S. 150 (1995) (No. 93-6892). 
124 See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14. 
125 See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text. 
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have the prior consistent statements that would help it in evaluating whether the 
event happened as the child testified at trial, or whether the child fabricated it. 
These are difficult cases, and the judge should be able to give the jury whatever 
evidence it will find reasonably helpful and probative. The fact-finder's need for 
this information is particularly acute when the witness is a young child victim, as 
such children are especialll vulnerable when testifying in an intimidating and 
un supportive atmosphere. 12 
D. Specifics of Proposed Amendment of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) 
Current Rule 801(d)(1)(B)'s underinclusiveness results in a confusing two-
track system of admissibility for a testifying witness's prior consistent 
statements: some are admissible as substantive evidence; others mal be 
admissible for the limited purpose of rehabilitating a witness's credibility.12 But 
under the current scheme, the latter must be excluded pursuant to Rule 403 even 
for that limited purpose if the court concludes the jury is likely to use them as 
substantive evidence instead.128 Because the current Rule artificially excludes 
some helpful prior consistent statements, this approach can unnecessarily result 
in reversible error. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) should be amended to permit the trial court 
judge to admit a witness's prior consistent statements that are helpful to rebut his 
or her impeachment. 129 The proffered statements should first be evaluated by the 
judge under Rule 104(a)130 as to whether they meet the relevancy requirements of 
Rules 401 and 402; if so, the statements should be subject to exclusion, in the 
126 See Tome, 513 U.S. at 153-54; Lawson v. State, 865 A2d 617, 631 (Md. App. 2005); Daigle, 
supra note 109, at 93 (children's testimony is "often unclear or incomplete"); Friedman, supra note 
29, at 277 ("Often the child who charges that an adult abused her is unable to testify at trial, or at 
least unable to testify effectively under standard procedures."); Gail S. Goodman et al., Child 
Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause: The American Psychological Association Brief in 
Maryland v. Craig, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 13 (1991); Jones, supra note 85, at 491-92 & nn.199-
201. 
127 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. 
128 FED. R. EVID. 403, advisory committee's note (advising courts to consider the effectiveness of a 
limiting instruction under Rule 105 when deciding whether to exclude evidence under Rule 403). 
See supra note 6. 
129 See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 515 (citing, inter alia, Ellicott, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 
439; Ryan v. UPS, 205 F.2d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 1953); People v. Walsh, 301 P.2d 247, 250-51 (Cal. 
1956); People v. Singer, 89 N.E.2d 710, 711-12 (N.Y. 1949». 
130 See Tome, 513 U.S. at 154 ("The trial court admitted all of the statements over defense counsel's 
objection, accepting the Government's argument that they rebutted the implicit charge that AT.'s 
testimony was motivated by a desire to live with her mother."); id. at 176 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
("In this case, the Court of Appeals decided ... that AT.'s prior consistent statements were 
probative on the question of whether her story as a witness reflected a motive to lie. There is no 
reason to reevaluate this factbound conclusion."); United States v. Toney, 161 F.3d 404,408 (6th 
Cir. 1998) ("The district court's determination of when the motive to lie arose is a factual finding, 
which we review under the 'clearly erroneous' standard."). 
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court's discretion under Rules 403 or 611 (a)(2), 13l if they are unnecessarily 
cumulative. 
This amendment would do awai with the need for limiting instructions that 
are so baffiing as to be ineffective. \3 As the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit has pointed out repeatedly, "The credibility/substance 
distinction is illusory in this context. ,,133 
The question of helpfulness is first a question of relevance under Rules 40 I 
and 402 as to rehabilitation of the declarant in light of the impeachment that has 
been undertaken. 134 Statements lacking probative value as to that purpose should 
be exc1uded. 135 In making this determination, however, it is essential that the 
court refrain from finding whether a particular motive that is contested by the 
13l See supra notes 75-77, 114, 116 and accompanying text. 
132 E.g., United States v. Copes, 345 F.2d 723, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (quoting United States v. 
DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1964)). Even the defense lawyers' association arguing in support of 
the petitioner in Tome conceded this point, stating in its brief: 
The only change adopted by the Rule in 1975 is that the prior consistent statements, 
once admitted, could be given substantive effect. This was a relatively minor change 
that realistically had little effect, since most juries were probably ill-equipped to treat 
a prior consistent statement as "rehabilitative", yet to understand that it was not to be 
considered as "substantive evidence". The change simply did away with a distinction 
that meant nothing to juries anyway. 
Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995) (No. 93-6892) (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added). See supra note 108 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 61-63. 
133 United States v. Beltran, 165 F.3d 1266, 1273 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., concurring). See 
United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1272-73 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The Rule [801(d)(I)(B)] thus 
does not change the type of statements that may be admitted; its only effect is to admit these 
statements [that are relevant under Rule 402 and pass muster under Rule 403] as substantive 
evidence rather than solely for the purpose of rehabilitation."). 
134 See Tome, 513 U.S. at 157-58. 
[T]he question is whether A. T.'s out-of-court statements rebutted the alleged link 
between her desire to be with her mother and her testimony, not whether they 
suggested that A.T.'s in-court testimony was true. The Rule speaks of a party 
rebutting an alleged motive, not bolstering the veracity of the story told. 
[d. In the cited passage, the Court's intended meaning seems to be that the prior statements are 
admissible to rebut the influence of an alleged motive, not simply to bolster the declarant's 
testimony by repeating its substance. 
135 See, e.g., United States v. Drury, 396 F.3d 1303, 1316-17 (lIth Cir. 2005) (defendant's prior 
consistent statement, telling his son, after his arrest, that he had merely been "role-playing" with a 
federal agent was properly excluded). 
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declarant exists. To do so would "usurp the jury's function.,,136 Rather, the court 
should consider whether the prior consistent statement might be helpful to the 
jury in determining if the motive to lie existed.137 Reliability will be tested by 
cross-examination of the declarant at trial. If the court concludes that prior 
consistent statement evidence would be helpful, it should consider whether to 
limit, under Rule 611(a), the mode of proof to be used. 138 The admissibility of 
more than one statement, even if otherwise admissible under the rule, should be 
within the court's discretion.139 The erroneous admission of prior consistent 
136 See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text, and text accompanying note 102. Cf United 
States v; Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769,777 (2d Cir. 1983) (credibility of in-court witnesses is solely 
a question for the jury). 
137 See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 511 ("The [premotive] rule can hamper the jury's fact-
finding mission by placing an often crucial factual determination where it does not belong-in the 
hands of the trial judge."). As Judge Bullock explains: 
Sometimes, a trial judge may find that the motive arose and the prior consistent 
statement was made on particular dates when a different fact-finder could reasonably 
choose different dates. This results in a trial judge sometimes finding a prior 
consistent statement to be made postmotive when a jury could reasonably find it to be 
made premotive, or vice-versa. Prior consistent statements that may rehabilitate 
should not be excluded in such circumstances. This situation could be rectified by 
using the Second Circuit's Grunewald standard: If it is "reasonably possible for the 
jury to say that the prior consistent statements did in fact antedate the motive 
disclosed on the cross-examination, the court should not exclude them." .... 
Additionally, it is often difficult for the trial court to pin down the date when a 
charged improper influence or motive arose or the date when a statement was made. 
Frequently, and particularly in criminal drug trials, witnesses cannot remember even 
the month in which a particular event occurred. Evidence concerning when an 
improper influence or motive arose and when a particular prior consistent statement 
was made may be scant. The trial judge should be free to allow the jury to weigh the 
evidence under all the circumstances without being bound by a restrictive time-line 
rule. 
!d. at 537-38 (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 566 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd on 
other grounds, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)) (emphasis added). See id. at 515 (citing cases). See also 
United States v. Baron, 602 F.2d 1248, 1252-53 (7th Cir. 1979) (whether motive to falsify existed 
at time of statement may well be for the jury to decide). But see, e.g., United States v. Prieto, 232 
F.3d 816, 819-22 (11th Cir. 2000) (trial judge determines, as an "individualized and careful 
calibration of complex fact," when a motive to fabricate came into existence). See also supra notes 
81-82 and accompanying text. 
138 See supra note 76. 
139 See United States v. Copes, 345 F.2d 723, 723-24 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (no error in admitting 
extrinsic evidence, through testimony of two other witnesses, of victim-witness's prior consistent 
statements, when defense had impugned her credibility). 
Tome characterized as "rather weak" the charge that A.T. had fabricated her testimony 
so that she could live with her mother, and it complained that "the Government was 
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statements is most often found to be hannless because the evidence is blo 
definition cumulative of a testifying witness's in-court, sworn testimony. 1 0 
Tome is the exception: the Court reasoned that the error was reversible because 
the child victim's court testimony was weak, and the prosecution had 
"present[ ed] a parade of sympathetic and credible witnesses who did no more 
than recount [the child's] detailed out-of-court statements to them.,,141 
In Tome the trial judge permitted six witnesses to testify regarding the 
child's prior consistent statements: a babysitter, the child's mother who 
overheard the statements to the babysitter on one of two dates to which the 
babysitter testified, a social worker, and three pediatricians. 142 The defense made 
no objection to one doctor's testimony; the other two doctors' testimony was 
admitted under Rule 803(4) (recognizing a hearsay exception for statements 
made by a person seeking medical diagnosis or treatment)/43 but the United 
States Court of Appeals upheld the admission of all the statements under Rule 
80l(d)(1)(B).I44 Thus, as the case was presented to the Supreme Court, six 
witnesses, but not the child, testified under Rule 801(d)(I)(B) to the child's out-
of-court statements. 
Though this author would quarrel with the Court's arguable implication that 
the jury did not understand that the underlying question was the child's 
credibility, the calling of so many witnesses under Rule 801 (d)( 1 )(B) does strike 
one as excessive. The best way to address this issue is through considered use of 
Rules 403 and 611. The trial court should exercise its discretion to exclude 
unduly cumulative testimony if it would cause unnecessary delay or likely result 
in unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs the added probative value the 
testimony would bring to the proceedings. In the Tome situation, in response to a 
Rule 403 or 611(a)(2) objection, or on its own motion, the trial judge should 
ordinarily restrict the extrinsic evidence of the witness's prior consistent 
statements to one or two other witnesses. If the witness's prior consistent 
statements have been admitted under another hearsay exception, such as Rule 
803(4), the court should take that into account as well. 
pennitted to present a parade of sympathetic and credible witnesses who did no more 
than recount A.T.'s detailed out-of-court statements to them." Now suppose A.T. had 
made all those statements at a time when, so far as she knew, a change of custody 
arrangements was not in the offing. Satisfaction of the premotive requirement might 
mean that the earlier statements more clearly rebut the fabrication charge-but that 
charge would be just as weak as in the actual case, meaning that the parade of 
witnesses would be, if anything, even less necessary and appropriate. Presumably the 
Court would not object to the trial court's exercise of discretion to admit only one 
prior statement in rebuttal. 
Friedman, supra note 29, at 317 (footnote omitted). 
140 See supra note 62. 
141 513 U.S. at 165. See United States v. Powell, 334 F.3d 42, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding error in 
case before it to be harmless, where testifying witness proved his own prior consistent statement). 
142 513 U.S. at 154. 
143 [d. at 154-55. 
144 [d. at 155. 
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In child abuse cases, a perspicacious juror would most like to hear the 
child's initial complaint and to learn under what circumstances it was made. For 
example, if the complaint was made to a parent, the juror may like to see that 
parent testify and be cross-examined as to any motive to coach the child. 
Hearing a witness, such as a police officer, social worker, or psychologist, who 
heard a subsequent consistent statement by the child would not be as persuasive 
to that juror if the juror had not had the opportunity to assess for himself the 
credibility of the first report. 
Yet crafting a rule (like Louisiana's rule permitting the substantive use of a 
consistent "initial complaint of sexually assaultive behavior"145) to admit only the 
child's "initial" prior consistent statement is unsatisfactory. How can we ever be 
sure that the earliest statement the lawyer knows about was the "initial" report? 
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) should be amended to provide: 
A statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the 
statement is ... consistent with the declarant's testimony and is af'feFed ta 
rebut would be helpful to the trier of fact in assessing what effect. if any, to 
give to impeachment, such as by a prior inconsistent statement, or an express 
or implied charge against the declarant of memory loss, reeeat-fabrication~ or 
improper influence aF mati'le .... 146 
Judge Bullock, an experienced trial judge, has called for a substantively similar 
amendment. 147 Impeachment would remain a condition precedent to possible 
admission of a prior consistent statement under this Rule. 148 The suggested 
added language to the Rule is intended to facilitate application by the trial judge 
and the fashioning of an appropriate jury instruction, if such evidence is 
admitted. 149 The "such as" phrase is used in the event that the drafter did not 
145 LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 801 (D)(l)(d) (1995). 
146 FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(I)(B). Deletions from current Rule 801(d)(l)(B) are shown by strike-
throughs and additions are shown by underlining. 
147 See Bullock & Gardner, supra note 14, at 534. 
First, the amendment should reject the per se time-line premotive rule and allow the 
admission of prior consistent statements where the statements are relevant and have 
value but are inadmissible under the Tome Court's interpretation of Rule 
801(d)(I)(B). Second, the amendment should expressly provide for the admission of 
prior consistent statements as substantive evidence in all cases where such statements 
are admissible for rehabilitation. 
Id. at 537 ("The suggestions made in this Article will not change the result in the vast majority of 
situations, but will refocus the inquiry regarding the admission of prior coIi:sistent statements where 
it belongs-on relevancy."). 
148 E.g., United States v. Smith, 746 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1984). 
149 Professor Graham's pre-Tome proposal for amendment of Rule 801(d)(l)(B), like the proposal 
in this article, addressed several forms of impeachment, but used the following language: 
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foresee all possible methods of impeachment that can be rebutted in this way. ISO 
"Improper motive" is deleted as redundant to "fabrication." "Improper 
influence" is retained but repositioned, as its application in a non-"fabrication" 
context would be when one is impeached by the notion that one's bias affected 
one's perception or memory. In this situation, a prior consistent statement when 
one had no bias could refute the impeachment. 
The Committee Note should point out the need for the court to employ 
Rules 403 and 611 and to exercise its discretionlSI to curtail unnecessarily 
cumulative evidence, so as to avoid the prejudicial effect the Court's majority 
found in Tome.152 The proposed rule does not mention Rule 403 or Rule 611 in 
A statement is not hearsay if.. . [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is 
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is . . . 
[c]onsistent with his testimony and the statement (i) rebuts an express or implied 
charge against him of partiality, (ii) supports an explanation or denial of a charge 
against him of self-contradiction, or (iii) rebuts an express or implied charge against 
him of lack of recollection or contrivance accompanying a charge of self-
contradiction. 
Graham, supra note 54, at 616. 
150 See, e.g., MINN. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (stating that a statement is not hearsay ifit is "consistent 
with the declarant's testimony and helpful to the trier of fact in evaluating the declarant's 
credibility as a witness"). 
151 See Daigle, supra note 109, at III ("Permitting judicial discretion in the admissibility of post-
motive prior consistent statements is appropriate .... A relevancy inquiry, where the value of the 
statement is balanced against the risks of admission, can competently address concerns about the 
cumulative or prejudicial effect of a child's statements."); Friedman, supra note 29, at 315. 
First the court should assess the rebuttal value of the prior statement. Rebuttal value 
requires both need to rebut the charge and effectiveness in doing so. Ordinarily, but 
not inevitably, a statement made after the alleged improper influence arose will not be 
effective in rebutting the charge that the witness's trial testimony is the product of the 
influence. Second, if the prior statement appears to have substantial rebuttal value, 
the court should consider factors weighing against admissibility of the statement. 
These include expenditure of time and, if the prior statement includes an overhang of 
assertions not included in the witness's trial testimony, the prejudice that this 
potentially creates, especially in hindering the party opponent's ability to cross-
examine the witness with respect to those statements. If the negative factors are 
substantial, the court should consider excluding the statement, redacting the statement, 
or otherwise limiting the information that may be presented about it or the use that the 
jury may make of it. 
!d. But see Daniel J. Capra, Prior Consistent Statements and the Supreme Court, 213 N.Y.L.J. 3, 
37 (1995) (arguing that allowing judges discretion as to admissibility of post-motive statements 
would result in the defendant's being "subject to all kinds of bolstering statements"). 
152 See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 165 (1995). 
If the Rule were to permit the introduction of prior statements as substantive evidence 
to rebut every implicit charge that a witness' in-court testimony results from recent 
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its text because those Rules potentially apply to all situations that are not 
governed by a mandatory rule. To mention Rules 403 and 611 in one Rule might 
misleadingly suggest that they were inapplicable to others.153 
fabrication or improper influence or motive, the whole emphasis of the trial could 
shift to the out-of-court statements, not the in-court ones. The present case illustrates 
the point. In response to a rather weak charge that A.T.'s testimony was a fabrication 
created so the child could remain with her mother, the Government was permitted to 
present a parade of sympathetic and credible witnesses who did no more than recount 
A.T.'s detailed out-of-court statements to them .... At closing argument before the 
jury, the Government placed great reliance on the prior statements for substantive 
purposes but did not once seek to use them to rebut the impact of the alleged motive. 
Id. Professor Friedman would apply his approach to the Tome facts as follows: 
How would this system work in Tome? If, as both the Court of Appeals and the 
Supreme Court believed, the charge of improper influence was a weak one, the need 
for rebuttal was correspondingly weak. The spontaneity of A.T.'s first statement, to 
her babysitter Rocha, might give that statement some rebuttal value, notwithstanding 
that the statement was made after the alleged influence arose. The subsequent pretrial 
statements, made after interrogation of A.T. began, have far less rebuttal value, and 
their incremental value would be less still if the first statement were admitted. 
Moreover, it was principally the subsequent statements that added information not 
contained in A.T.'s trial testimony. Though the first statement-"my father gets drunk 
and he thinks I'm his wife"-added some substance to the current testimony, this could 
easily be suppressed from Rocha's testimony. Thus, the trial court could have 
decided to admit the first statement, in some form, but not the others. I do not mean 
to suggest that this outcome would be indubitably correct, only that it would be 
plausible, within the trial court's discretion. 
Friedman, supra note 29, at 315-16 (footnotes omitted). As to Professor Friedman's point about 
suppressing the babysitter's testimony that the four-year-old child had said, "[M]y father gets drunk 
and thinks I'm his wife," this author would argue that the indirect phraseology added probative 
value for the jury that would be useful to it in its task of deciding the likelihood that the statement 
was made as a result of the child's lying scheme to be removed from the father's home, and thus 
whether the child's trial testimony also sprang from such a poisoned well. Id. 
153 In this regard the proposed language differs from the model draft that Prof. Capra submitted to 
the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, reflecting Judge Bullock's proposal (see supra notes 
14 and 147). That draft read: 
A statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is 
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . 
consistent with the declarant's testimony and is efferes te rebet !Hi e*flress er implies 
saarge agamst the sesl8l'8Bt ef reseat fabrisaliea er ilRflreper iaf.lHease er meti'le 
admissible. subject to Rule 403. to rehabilitate the declarant's credibilitv as a witness. 
Capra Memorandum, supra note 14. 
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The Committee Note also should explain that the amendment is not 
intended to change the case law under the current Rule that permits extrinsic 
evidence of the prior statement, as long as the declarant also testifies and is 
subject to cross-examination about the statement.154 Because the old common 
law reluctance to let a declarant testify to his own prior consistent statement has 
faded from view/55 the Committee ought to suggest, however, that if the 
impeachment has occurred on cross-examination, the better practice ordinarily is 
to first raise the prior statement on the redirect of the declarant.. 156 
Finally, the Committee Note should remind its readers that Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) does not restrict admission of evidence under other Rules, such as 
the rule of completeness codified in Rule 106.157 
E. Other Alternatives 
If an agreement cannot be reached that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) should be 
amended in the manner proposed, then at least two other alternatives, besides 
inaction, remain. The less desirable alternative would simply be to make clear 
that failure of a prior consistent statement to fit within Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does 
154 See supra note 50. 
ISS See, e.g., People v. Singer, 89 N.E.2d 710 (N.Y. 1949); State v. George, 30 N.C. 324 (1848) (per 
curiam) (discussing reluctance but pennitting such proof) (over dissent). 
156 See Graham, supra note 54, at 618-19 (stating that the "introduction of the consistent statement 
initially through the testimony of the declarant best serves the interests of justice," as well as the 
witness's "convenience"). Professor Friedman points out that the child in Tome was excused from 
the stand before the prosecution offered evidence of prior statements, which left the defense unable 
to cross-examine the child further as to them, unless it recalled her to the stand, which it did not, for 
legitimate tactical reasons. Friedman, supra note 29, at 300-01. Yet the defense already had 
solicited from the child either a denial or a showing of a failure of memory. The situation in Tome 
was atypical in that the declarant had first been examined about the statements on cross-
examination. See supra note 29 (citing United States v. Owens) and note 50. It was defense 
counsel who first brought up the question of the child witness's prior statements (likely in an effort 
to suggest that she had been coached). The child "testified [on cross-examination] that the only 
person with whom she had discussed the alleged abuse was the prosecutor. Tr. 145. The child 
denied that she ever spoke with her babysitter about the alleged abuse; she either failed to respond 
or stated that she was unable to remember when asked about other out-of-court statements 
concerning the alleged abuse. Tr. 152-53." Brief for the Petitioner, at 5, Tome v. United States, 
513 U.S. 150 (1995) (No. 93-6892); Reply Brief for Petitioner, Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 
150 (1995) (No. 93-6892). . 
157 See United States v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613, 626 (4th Cir. 2003) (prior consistent statements were 
admitted properly under the rule of completeness); United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 
1979). But see Judith A. Archer, Note, Prior Consistent Statements: Temporal Admissibility 
Standard Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(1)(B), 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 759, 780-83 (1987) 
(arguing that Rule 106 does not pennit substantive use of the prior statement, so that Rule 
801(d)(I)(B) should apply). Note that, under the proposal made in this article, the availability of 
Rule 106 as another avenue of admissibility would not preclude admissibility under Rule 
801(d)(I)(B) of a statement that rebuts either a charge of fabrication or impeachment by prior 
inconsistent statement. 
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not preclude admission for the limited purpose of rehabilitation of a witness's 
credibility. Amendment of Rule 613 to this effect (using language like that of 
Maryland Rule 5-616(c)(2),t58 for example) would achieve this result, though it 
would continue the two-track approach to admissibility and the need for limiting 
instructions159 and would not assuage concomitant resulting confusion. 
In recognition of the fact that many jurors view sexual allegations with 
special suspicion,160 it would be preferable to complement this general, less-than-
ideal approach by adding a special rule permitting the admissibility, as 
substantive evidence, of prior consistent complaints of sexual assault when the 
victim testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the 
complaint. Though this approach may be criticized on the ground that society 
should not be automatically suspect of allegations of sexual assault,161 the 
common law rule admitting "prompt" complaints of rape (by definition, then, 
prior to the victim's trial testimony) has had practical and beneficial effects for 
victims in many prosecutions. 162 The common law rule's codification in 
Maryland Rule 5-802.1 (d), 163 for example, and its extension there to all sexual 
assaults, including child abuse, has permitted the admission of some of a child's 
prior consistent statements as substantive evidence when they would not have 
been admissible under Tome's construction of Rule 801(d)(1)(B).I64 
The requirement of "promptness" is not without its difficulties as many 
sexual assault victims, especially young victims, are reluctant to confide in 
anyone about the assault. Their hesitation may result from fear of the abuser, 
shame, or simply a lack of understanding that what has happened to them is 
wrong. 165 Therefore, deletion of the promptness requirement and a provision 
158 Maryland Rule 5-616(c)(2) provides: "A witness whose credibility has been attacked may be 
rehabilitated by ... [e ]xcept as provided by statute, evidence of the witness' prior statements that 
are consistent with the witness' present testimony, when their having been made detracts from the 
impeachment. ... " MD. RULE 5-616(c)(2). 
159 Holmes v. State, 712 A.2d 554 (Md. 1998). 
160 See, e.g., Parker v. State, 846 A.2d 485, 494-95 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), cert. denied, 855 
A.2d 350 (Md. 2004); Cole v. State, 574 A.2d 326, 331-33 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990). 
161 See, e.g., Kathryn M. Starich, The Paradox a/the Prompt Complaint Rule, 37 B.C. L. REv. 441, 
443-44 (1996). 
162 See, e.g., Gaerian v. State, 860 A.2d 396 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (upholding admission of 
evidence); Parker v. State, 846 A.2d 485 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (semble); Robinson v. State, 
827 A.2d 167 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (semble), cert. denied, 833 A.2d 32 (Md. 2003); Nelson v. 
State, 768 A.2d 738 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (semble); Terry v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 614 
(Va. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding admission of evidence under Va. Code Ann. § 19-2-268.2). 
163 Maryland Rule 5-802.1(d) provides-under the same preconditions as Federal Rule 801(d)(I), 
that the declarant testify at the trial and be subject to cross-examination concerning the statement-
for the admissibility as substantive evidence of "[ a] statement that is one of prompt complaint of 
sexually assaultive behavior to which the declarant was subjected if the statement is consistent with 
the declarant's testimony." MD. RULE 5-802.1(d). See LYNN McLAIN, 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE: 
STATE AND FEDERAL § 801(3):2 (2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2004). A complete discussion of this Rule 
and its corollaries in a vast majority of the states is beyond the scope of this article. 
164 E.g., Gaerian v. State, 860 A.2d 396 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004). 
165 E.g., State v. Bethune, 578 A.2d 364, 366-68 (N.J. 1990). 
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instead for the admissibility of any prior consistent complaint of sexual assault, 
subject to Rules 403 and 611, would be fairer. 
Of course, rather than a Rule change addressing only sexual assaults, it 
would be preferable to amend Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to create a properly flexible rule 
that would work well for all types of situations by permitting the substantive use 
of all relevant prior consistent statements, subject to exclusion in the court's 
discretion under Rules 403 and 611. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(I)(B)'s underinclusiveness regarding 
admissibility, as substantive evidence, of a witness's out-of-court statements 
consistent with the witness's in-court testimony, has resulted in an unsatisfactory 
and inefficient dual track system for admissibility. Under the current approach 
many prior consistent statements must carefully be admitted only for the limited 
purpose of rehabilitating the witness's credibility-else reversible error may 
result. 166 This two-tiered system is constitutionally unnecessary, as Crawford has 
recently affirmed that the Confrontation Clause is met by the witness's testifying 
and being subject to cross-examination at the trial. 167 The best way to prevent the 
unnecessary creation of error when a witness's prior consistent statements are 
admitted for substantive purposes, rather than for the limited purpose of 
evaluating the credibility of the witness's in-court testimony, is to amend the 
Rule to permit the substantive use of prior consistent statements that the trial 
court finds, under Rule 104(a), would be helpful to the fact-finder. 
The Rule should be amended to permit the admission, subject to Rule 403, 
of all prior consistent statements that a jury would reasonably find helpful in 
assessing what weight to give to the witness's trial testimony. If an opponent's 
allegation that a witness has a motive to lie is neither based on an objective fact 
that the witness concedes to be true, nor can be traced to a determinable time that 
would have provided a window for earlier statements on the topic, the judge 
ordinarily should permit the jury to hear one or two of the witness's prior 
consistent statements, to aid it in deciding whether such a motive existed and 
affected the witness's testimony. 
Short of such an amendment, the Federal Rules of Evidence should be 
amended to include a hearsay exception for prior consistent complaints of sexual 
assault and to explicitly provide for limited admissibility, as to credibility, of a 
testifying witness's other prior consistent statements that do not qualify under 
Rule 801(d)(I)(B) but are nonetheless helpful to an evaluation of the witness's 
credibility. 
166 E.g., United States v. Kenyon, 397 F.3d 1071, 1080-82 (8th Cir. 2005) (reversible error to admit 
extrinsic evidence under Rule 801(d)(I)(B) rather than for limited purpose of rehabilitating child 
abuse victim's credibility). See supra note 6. 
167 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
